Does Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative commit him to the view that lying is always morally wrong? by Perold, Martin Ludwig
  
Does Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative Commit Him 
to the View that Lying is Always Morally Wrong? 
 
by 
 
Martin Ludwig Perold 
 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
Master of Arts 
 
at the 
 
University of the Witwatersrand 
 
2010 
 
under the supervision of 
 
Prof L Allais  
  
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Immanuel Kant‟s essay “On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic 
Concerns” (1797) he famously argues that it is never permissible to tell a lie, even 
when lying could save someone‟s life.  This view has met with a great deal of 
criticism from philosophers, who argue that his ethical theory must be flawed if it 
leads to such an undesirable conclusion. 
 
In this report, I explore this claim, arguing that this conclusion does not, after all, 
follow from Kant‟s ethical theory.  I focus in particular on the three formulations of 
the categorical imperative – the Formula of the Universal Law, the Formula of 
Humanity and the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends – and argue that none of these 
versions of Kant‟s key ethical principle requires him to make the rigorous claim that 
we may never lie under any circumstances.  Although lying turns out to be morally 
wrong in the majority of cases, based on a proper application of Kant‟s theory, there 
are likely to be some situations in which lying is permissible or even obligatory, as I 
hope to show in this research. 
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DOES IMMANUEL KANT’S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 
COMMIT HIM TO THE VIEW THAT LYING IS ALWAYS 
MORALLY WRONG? 
  
In his infamous essay “On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic 
Concerns” (1797), Immanuel Kant adopts the view that it is never permissible to lie 
under any circumstances.  This is because he claims that telling the truth “in all 
declarations” is “a sacred and unconditionally commanding law of reason that admits 
of no expediency whatsoever” (RL, 427, 65)1.  It seems as though this view follows 
from Kant‟s ethical theory, developed in his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
Morals (1785) and the Metaphysics of Morals (1797), as well as in his lectures on 
ethics during the eighteenth century.   In these works, Kant maintains that telling the 
truth is a perfect duty to oneself that may not be violated. 
 
This position is certainly controversial, as it is easy to think of cases where lying 
appears to be morally permissible.  For instance, people often tell so-called “white 
lies” to avoid hurting the feelings of others, such as when someone assures her partner 
that she loves the expensive gift that he has just bought her, despite secretly despising 
it.  Similarly, an adult might lie to a child about the existence of the Tooth Fairy in 
order to lessen its distress upon losing a tooth; or a person might lure a friend to her 
house under false pretences in order to throw him a surprise birthday party.  As I will 
explain in a later section, these cases may all be regarded as lies, and they do not seem 
to be morally wrong.   
 
Lying is also common in everyday social exchanges, such as the standard response of 
“Fine, thank you” when someone inquires about one‟s health even when one is ill; or, 
to use Kant‟s own example, the convention of writing “Your obedient servant” at the 
end of a letter to a person whom one has no intention of serving or obeying (MM, 6: 
431, 554).  These lies do not seem to be morally reprehensible.  As Joseph Margolis 
                                            
1
 Throughout this dissertation, I will refer to Kant‟s works through abbreviations, with two page 
numbers shown.  The first page number refers to Kant‟s original page number, while the second one 
refers to the page of the version that I am using.  
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(1963: 414) points out, few people “would subscribe to the principle, „Lying is 
wrong‟” without exception. 
 
We can also provide examples of lies that seem to be not only morally permissible, 
but obligatory, such as telling a lie to save someone‟s life.  Kant‟s example (RL) 
involves lying to a murderer who wants to kill someone in one‟s house by telling him 
that his intended victim is not at home, thereby rescuing her.  If this lie would prevent 
the victim‟s death, it certainly seems as though we are required to tell it.  Kant‟s view, 
however, is that the lie is morally wrong regardless of the good it might do.  Because 
Kant thinks that “a lie always harms another” and “does harm to humanity in general, 
inasmuch as it vitiates the very source of right”, we may not allow even “the slightest 
exception” to the duty to tell the truth (RL, 426-427, 64-65, my italics).   
 
This view certainly seems objectionably strict and rigorous, since it does not appear 
reasonable to claim that a life-saving lie may never be told.  It is therefore not 
surprising that many philosophers disagree with Kant on this issue – as James Mahon 
(2009: 201) points out, “Kant‟s writings on lies have elicited an unprecedented 
amount of abuse”.  Wolfgang Schwarz (1970: 62) emphasises how controversial 
Kant‟s position is, noting that Kant “seems to have been carried away by formal 
considerations and lost all touch with reality” in drawing a conclusion that “has 
embarrassed even some of his friends and served as a cause for rejoicing among his 
foes.”   
 
The question that I propose to explore in this dissertation is whether the seemingly 
unreasonable conclusion that lies are always morally wrong indeed follows from 
Kant‟s ethical theory.  As Allen Wood (2008: 1) explains, if Kant‟s ethics lead to the 
extreme result that lying is never morally permissible, then we may be able to show 
that “there must be something fundamentally wrong with Kantian ethics”.  The 
position that I will defend here is that the undesirable conclusion does not, after all, 
follow from Kant‟s ethical principles and that his famous categorical imperative does 
not require us to tell the truth at all times.  I hope to show that, although lying is 
generally morally wrong, there are some cases in which it is permissible (such as 
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telling a lie to save a life), and that these cases do not undermine Kant‟s ethical 
thought.  
 
Of course, I must begin by being explicit about how I will understand the term 
“lying”, and this will be discussed in the first section of the research.  Next, I need to 
explain what Kant‟s ethical theory entails and how he reaches his conclusions about 
lying.  The focus of this dissertation will be on the categorical imperative, which is 
Kant‟s rule for determining the morality of an action under consideration.  According 
to most authors, there are at least three different formulations of this rule (Korsgaard, 
1986; Wood, 1999; Guyer, 2007).  In the second section of the dissertation I will 
explain the three versions of the rule in detail and show how they are supposed to be 
used to reach conclusions about whether actions are permissible or not.  Here, I will 
explain why Kant thinks that lying is impermissible and abhorrent.  This section will 
also discuss Kant‟s distinction between perfect and imperfect duties (LE, MM), and 
show why he thinks that telling the truth falls under the former category. 
 
In the next part of the dissertation, I will apply the various formulations of the 
categorical imperative to the question of lying and specifically to the case of lying to 
the murderer at the door.  There is a section devoted to each version of the theory, and 
I aim to show that none of them leads to the conclusion that lying is always wrong.  
The analysis will show that we may justified in lying to the murderer at the door, for 
reasons that I will make explicit, and that Kant‟s moral theory is not as rigorous as it 
appears at first glance. 
 
The final section of the research focuses on an alternative interpretation of the 
categorical imperative, as suggested by Philip Stratton-Lake (2000), Jens 
Timmermann (2007) and Robert Hanna (2009).  This view regards the categorical 
imperative not as a decision-making rule that guides our actions, but rather as an 
explanation for why a given action is permissible or not.  I will critically discuss this 
position, showing that it is a plausible way of interpreting Kant‟s moral thought and 
that it does not lead to the rigorous conclusion that lying is always forbidden. 
 
4 
 
Finally, I will conclude that Kant‟s moral theory is not as strict and extreme as it 
appears and that he is mistaken to conclude that lying is always wrong.  None of the 
formulations of the categorical imperative entail the conclusion that lying is never 
impermissible, although it is probably impermissible in the majority of cases.  
Furthermore, the alternative interpretation of the principle provides us with another, 
plausible way of making sense of Kant‟s ethics that does not require us to tell the truth 
at all times, but explains why we find ourselves in a moral dilemma when we are 
confronted with situations like those involving the murderer at the door.  
Consequently, Kant‟s moral theory is not as objectionable as it seems, since it permits 
lying under certain circumstances.  I will now consider the concept of lying and what 
counts as instances of it. 
 
I.  The Concept of Lying 
Before we are able to apply Kant‟s ethical theory to the question of lying, it is 
necessary to clarify exactly what he takes the term to mean, and what kinds of 
statements should be classified as lies.  Kant explains that lying “comprises every 
intentional untruth, or every intentionally false statement of my disposition” (LE, 27: 
605, 351), so that “in ethics... no intentional untruth in the expression of one‟s 
thoughts can refuse [the] harsh name” (MM, 6:429, 552) of a lie.  These definitions 
highlight the two key features of a lie: first, it must be an untruthful statement; and 
second, its untruth must be intentional.  I will discuss each of these features in turn. 
 
To understand the first feature, we must distinguish between an untruthful statement 
and a false one.  A false statement is simply a proposition that is not true in the world 
we inhabit.  For example, if I make the assertion “Paris is the capital of Germany”, I 
make a false statement, since the proposition I affirm does not hold true in our 
universe.  An untruthful statement, on the other hand, is an assertion that is made in 
the belief that it is false, even if it is really true.  Suppose that I firmly believe that 
Paris is the capital of Germany – if I then make the claim “Paris is the capital of 
France”, the statement that I make might be true (since it corresponds to a fact about 
the world), but it is nevertheless untruthful (because I do not believe it to be true and 
am miscommunicating my beliefs).  An untruthful statement is indeed “a false 
statement of one‟s disposition” since one is asserting something that one does not 
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believe to be true.  On my reading of Kant, lying requires the statement one makes to 
be untruthful, but not necessarily false (although it may be false). 
 
This means that a true statement such as “Paris is the capital of France” may be 
considered to be a lie if the speaker asserts it in the misguided belief that it is false.  
Frederick Siegler (1966) points out that lying requires the liar to believe the 
proposition he communicates to be false, but not that it actually be false.  I think that 
this is a plausible view to hold.  It seems reasonable to say that I have lied to you if I 
tell you something that I firmly believe to be untrue, even though it may later turn out 
to be true after all – as Thomas Carson (2006: 284) notes, “a necessary condition of 
lying” is “that the liar cannot believe the statement she makes is true”. 
 
It may be argued, however, that lying requires the statement to be false in addition to 
its being untruthful.  This is the position that Carson (2006: 284) holds, claiming that 
“In order to tell a lie, one must make a false statement”.  This means that a true 
proposition can never be a lie, since, as Carson (2006: 284) explains, one may refute 
the claim that one has lied by “[s]howing that [the] statement [one has made] is true”.  
In this dissertation, however, I will adopt the view that lies need not be false 
statements.  This is because, as I will show later, what Kant considers to be abhorrent 
about lying is that it involves deception and the frustration of other people‟s ends; 
and, as I will argue, it is possible to deceive others without making any false 
statements. 
 
The second feature of Kant‟s definition of lying is that the untruth must be intentional.  
Thus, if I mistakenly believe that Paris is the capital of Germany as the result of a 
poorly-drawn map, and if I then communicate this statement to you, I am not lying.  I 
say something that is false, but, since I do not believe it to be false, I am not 
intentionally deceiving you.  It is not my aim to cause you to acquire a belief that I 
know to be false – I am merely mistaken in my belief.  As Siegler (1966: 128) notes, a 
“liar must... intend to deceive” someone else for her statement to properly be regarded 
as a lie, and a lie can occur “only if there is an express declaration of my willingness 
to inform the other of my thought” (LE, 27: 447, 203). 
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Of course, it might be argued that it is the truth or falsity of a proposition that 
determines whether or not it is a lie, and not the intention behind it, as Carson (2006) 
does.  However, it seems as though we would not blame or censure someone who 
makes a false statement (even under oath) if she sincerely believes that she is being 
honest.  What is at stake in this dissertation is whether or not there are any lies that are 
morally permissible, and it seems as though we should discount false statements that 
are told unintentionally, because it may be argued that any moral wrong that is 
committed in these cases is purely accidental.  Here I am concerned only with 
deliberate untruths, where the liar is fully aware that she is telling what she believes to 
be an untruth, and where she intends to cause someone else to believe the statement 
she makes.  As Kant says, “if it be that the other is ever meant to believe it, then... it is 
a lie” (LE, 27:62, 28).  In this paper, therefore, I will consider lies to be intentionally 
untruthful statements, discounting accidental ones. 
 
Now that I have explained how I will understand the terms “lying” and “lies” in this 
dissertation, I will consider some examples of “intentional untruths”.  Clearly, telling 
the murderer at the door that my friend is out when I know for a fact that she is in 
meets these criteria – I deliberately tell him a proposition that I do not believe to be 
true, with the intention of causing him to believe it.  This is an obvious case of lying, 
and would be considered a lie under most authors‟ definitions of the term (such as 
Siegler, 1966 and Carson, 2006).  However, there are other cases that I consider to be 
instances of lying that are not obviously lies. 
 
One such example is when a parent tells her child that there is a Tooth Fairy who will 
give him money for the tooth he has lost if he places it next to his bed at night.  The 
mother‟s intentions may be very noble, in that the child is upset about the gap in his 
mouth and needs comfort and solace.  However, on Kant‟s definition of lying, she lies 
to her child.  First, she does not herself believe that the Tooth Fairy exists – she 
probably intends to continue the charade by placing the money next to the child‟s bed 
herself during the night.  Thus she is untruthful in her assertion.  Moreover, the 
assertion is blatantly false, as it does not correspond to any real fact about the world 
(and would therefore be considered a lie on Carson‟s definition of the term too). 
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Second, the untruth is certainly intentional.  The mother wishes the child to acquire 
the belief that the Tooth Fairy exists and intends to deceive him, at least for the time 
being.  He will certainly cease to hold this belief when he is older but, for the 
moment, his mother‟s aim is for him to act on what she tells him; perhaps he will stop 
crying and put his tooth in a box, looking forward to his nocturnal visitor.  Thus this 
statement meets the requirements of a lie, as we have defined it here. 
 
It may be argued that the mother‟s story is not a lie because it is mere fantasy or 
pretence, just as a science fiction novel is, and that it is not to be taken seriously.  
However, the key difference between the mother‟s utterances and a novel is that 
fiction does not involve any intention of getting the reader to believe the story, while 
the tale about the Tooth Fairy does.  Consequently, only the latter statement is a lie, 
since fiction does not meet the requirement of intending to deceive someone.  A book 
marked “fiction” does not purport to tell the reader anything that is true – the reader is 
well aware that the sentences she reads are not facts, but stem from the imagination of 
the author and are not to be believed.  In the case of the Tooth Fairy, on the other 
hand, there is a clear intention from the mother to cause her child to acquire the belief 
in the fairy, and this intent is absent from fictional novels. 
 
Even though the mother seems to intend the child to acquire a false belief, we might 
argue that she is not doing him any wrong.  This is because of the unique status that is 
awarded to children on Kant‟s views.  For Kant, a child is “a passive citizen”, that is, 
someone like “a minor... whose preservation in existence (his being fed and protected) 
depends not on his management of his own business but on arrangements made by 
another” (MM, 6:314, 458).   
 
In other words, children are not fully morally developed, especially if they are very 
young, and they are incapable of looking after themselves.  As a result, they lack “the 
capacity to set ends according to reason” (Wood and O‟Neill, 1998: 198) and we are 
therefore entitled to treat them differently than adults.  We must regard them as 
having “insufficient autonomy” (Korsgaard, 1996: 351) to make rational choices, and 
we are therefore entitled to “use manipulative tactics” in order to make them do what 
is in their own best interests, since they lack the ability to determine this themselves.  
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Thus, when we tell a child an untruth to influence his behaviour and to get him to 
make a good choice, we may defend this action on the grounds that it is permissible to 
lie to “persons who should be regarded as incompletely developed” (Korsgaard, 1996: 
351). 
 
Tamar Schapiro (1999: 723) regards childhood as “a condition that prevents human 
beings from achieving autonomy „all at once‟” and emphasises the point that children 
have a “special status” in the “ethical commonwealth” (Schapiro, 1999: 721).  She 
regards childhood as a temporary “predicament” (Schapiro, 1999: 732) in which the 
child is prevented from making autonomous choices, although its ability to do so is 
developing.  On Schapiro‟s view, children are able to become agents through “play” – 
that is, they inhabit fantasy worlds through playing with each other, and with adults, 
where they can “more or less „deliberately‟ try on selves and worlds to be in” 
(Schapiro, 1999: 732).  Even though the play they engage in is not real, it enables 
them to “adopt[-] one or other persona” and “act the part of full agents” (Schapiro, 
1999: 732), thereby developing their capacity to make autonomous choices. 
 
We may plausibly see the untruth told to a child about the Tooth Fairy as a form of 
play.  When the parent invites the child into a fantasy world, she brings him into a 
realm where his actions count – he is able to “act the part... of one who can act” 
(Schapiro, 1999: 733).  She creates a make-believe world in which his decisions (such 
as leaving his tooth in a box next to his bed) have consequences (such as receiving the 
money the next morning), even though his actions have “an essentially provisional, 
experimental nature which adult action lacks” (Schapiro, 1999: 733).  Thus, even 
though the mother tells the child a deliberate falsehood, it seems as though her action 
may properly regarded as play rather than lying.  However, it may also be argued that 
it is a lie nonetheless, since it meets Kant‟s definition of lying; but, if it is a lie, we 
may excuse it because of the child‟s special status as an underdeveloped agent.   
 
Even if untruths told to children in a fantasy world are not lies, it seems as though 
apparently innocuous falsehoods told to adults with the intention of deceiving them 
should certainly be considered as lies.  Playing a practical joke on someone by telling 
her something that is false can be regarded as a lie, because the joke can succeed only 
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if the victim believes the untruth.  For instance, I might trick my friend into attending 
a formal party dressed as a Disney character by telling him that it is a fancy dress 
occasion.  Since I know it is a formal party, I speak untruthfully, and since my aim is 
for him to act on the false information I give him, the untruth is clearly intentional.  
Thus “[j]oking lies” (LE, 27:62, 28) told for the sake of amusement should also be 
regarded as lies, as should “a white lie” and the lies that politicians have to tell “to 
achieve their aims”, since all of these involve some form of deception.   
 
Kant also refers to “the tellings of tall stories, or braggings in company” (LE, 27:700, 
427) as instances of lying.  Embellishing a tale with exaggerations to make the story 
more interesting, or misreporting the size of the fish that one caught entail deception, 
even if there is some element of truth in the story.  For example, if I tell my friends 
that I caught an enormous carp weighing forty pounds, when it weighed only thirty 
pounds in reality, much of what I say is true – I did indeed catch a large fish.  Despite 
this element of truth, though, I still deceive them with an intentional untruth, since I 
deliberately overstate the weight of the fish.  As I shall argue later, Kant seems to 
regard exaggerations of facts as harmless lies, but they count as lies nonetheless. 
 
One further category of lies merits discussion here; that is, lies told “out of politeness” 
(LE, 27:701, 427) such as Kant‟s example of following social conventions by writing 
“Your obedient servant” (MM, 6: 431, 554) at the end of a letter, despite not being the 
recipient‟s servant.  It may be argued that this sentence is not a lie, since there is no 
apparent deception involved in this complimentary close – the recipient of the letter 
will certainly not take us to mean that we intend to serve and obey her.  This might 
not count as a lie, since nobody is expected to believe it.  Perhaps Kant‟s example is 
ill-chosen, but we may consider another case in point that shows how social 
conventions may plausibly be regarded as lies.   
 
Following Carson (2006), we may suppose that someone decides to invite an 
unpleasant old uncle to her wedding, even though she desperately hopes that he will 
decline the invitation, since she despises him.  Perhaps she extends the invitation to 
him only because her grandmother wishes her to, or because she feels pangs of guilt.  
If she then sends him an invitation worded “We sincerely hope that you will come to 
10 
 
our wedding”, it may be argued that she is lying to him, since she most certainly does 
not hope that he will attend.  Once again, the statement is an untruth, and it is also 
designed to deceive him into believing that he is welcome at the gathering, thereby 
meeting Kant‟s two criteria for being a lie.  This example is somewhat different to 
Kant‟s own example, but I think that it might plausibly be regarded as a lie out of 
courtesy, even if Kant‟s “obedient servant” example may not be. 
 
This section has shown that there are several cases that may reasonably be said to be 
lies, since they are deliberate untruths, but which, intuitively, do not seem wrong.  I 
will argue that Kant‟s ethical theory does not necessarily require us to say that all 
these instances of lying are morally impermissible.  Of course, one might object that 
there is something wrong with this definition of lying, and that it is too broad, but it 
seems as though the action of not telling the murderer at the door the truth is a clear 
case of lying, under any definition.  Thus, even though I will consider some of the 
examples that are not obviously lies in the following analysis, I will focus specifically 
on the case of the murderer at the door and how Kant‟s moral principles can be 
applied to it.  First, however, the categorical imperative has to be made explicit, and 
this will be done in the next section. 
 
II.  The Three Formulations of the Categorical Imperative      
In the second section of the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant develops 
his ethical principle known as the categorical imperative.  The categorical imperative 
is described by Allen Wood (2009: 1) as “the fundamental principle of ethical duties” 
and can be seen as a moral decision-making rule – it “says what action possible by me 
[or, indeed, anyone] would be good” (G, 414, 25).  Kant and his commentators, such 
as Wood (1999, 2009), Christine Korsgaard (1986) and Paul Guyer (2007) distinguish 
at least three different formulations of this principle, namely, the Formula of the 
Universal Law (hereafter abbreviated as the FUL), the Formula of Humanity (FH) and 
the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends (FKE).  In this section I will adopt the same 
division and explain each of the three versions in turn. 
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The Formula of the Universal Law (FUL) 
To understand the first formulation of the categorical imperative correctly, we must 
first consider Kant‟s conception of a maxim.  Kant defines a maxim as “a subjective 
principle for acting” (G, 421, 30, footnote 9) – in other words, it is an underlying, 
general rule to which we appeal when we perform actions.  Furthermore, Kant‟s 
theory requires that it be subjective; that is, “it is the principle of a particular subject 
or agent” (Guyer, 2007: 83).  This means that a maxim does not hold objectively, as a 
law of nature would, but is determined by reason “in accordance with the conditions 
of the subject” that is acting on it (G, 421, 30, footnote 9).    
 
The concept of a maxim may be explained more clearly with the use of an example, 
as Wood (1999) does.  He asks us to consider a situation where we have borrowed a 
book from him and have promised to return it by a specified time.  When we perform 
the actions necessary to bring the book back into his possession, we are following the 
maxim of keeping our promises and this, according to Wood (1999: 41) ensures that 
these actions are “to be esteemed”.   
 
Importantly, there seems to be no inherent moral value in the action of getting into my 
car and driving to Wood‟s house to return the book.  Instead, what makes the action 
meritorious is the fact that I perform it in accordance with the noble maxim of always 
keeping my promises.  If I were driving to Wood‟s house with the aim of 
assassinating him, I would be acting on a different maxim (perhaps of killing any 
philosophers I meet).  This maxim would render my action morally wrong, even 
though driving to his house appears morally neutral.  On this example, we can see 
why the maxim is subjective: the morality of the action can depend on my intentions 
in performing it.  In this way, the maxim tells us where “the moral worth of the action 
is located” (Wood, 1999: 40).             
 
Now that the concept of a maxim has been made explicit, we may examine the first 
formulation of the categorical imperative, or the FUL.  Kant states this principle as 
follows:  “Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law” (G, 421, 30).  He goes on to add that this “universal 
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law” should be seen as “a universal law of nature” (G, 421, 30)2.  Simply put, this 
means that we may determine whether or not a given action is morally permissible by 
considering a world in which everyone habitually acts on the maxim on which that 
action depends – that is, a world in which the maxim is a universal law of nature.  If 
we can consistently will the maxim to become a universal law of nature, then the 
action is permissible; if not, then it is morally wrong.  Kant intends this criterion of 
universalisability to be a rule from which “all imperatives of duty can be derived” (G, 
421, 30).  
 
The universalisability criterion is best explained by using an example.  Kant considers 
a “man in need” who borrows money and makes a false promise to repay it when “he 
knows well that he won‟t be able to” do so (G, 422, 31).  This is an obvious instance 
of lying, as the promise is intended to deceive the lender.  Now, to determine whether 
the false promise is morally permissible, we must identify the maxim on which it is 
based.  Kant expresses it as follows: “when I believe myself to be in need of money, I 
will borrow money and promise to pay it back, although I know that I can never do 
so” (G, 422, 31). 
 
We may now apply the FUL‟s universalisability test to this maxim, by considering a 
world in which everyone habitually acts on it; that is, a world where everyone 
borrows money and makes false promises to repay it whenever they are in need.  Is 
the maxim universalisable?  Kant explains that it is not, because “the end to be 
attained” from making a false promise in a world where everyone habitually does so 
would be “quite impossible, inasmuch as no one would believe what was promised 
him but would merely laugh at such utterances as being vain pretenses” (G, 422, 31).   
 
This maxim cannot, therefore, be willed to become a universal law of nature, since 
one would not be able to borrow money successfully by acting on that maxim.  As 
Guyer (2007, 85) explains, “no one in his right mind would accept such a promise, 
and thus one‟s own plan of getting out of trouble by making a false promise would be 
                                            
2
 Some authors like Guyer (2007) regard this alternative statement of the first formulation of the 
categorical imperative to be a separate version of it, distinguishing between the FUL and the “Formula 
of the Law of Nature” (FLN).  For the purposes of this paper, I will regard the FUL and the FLN as 
equivalent and refer to the principle as the FUL only, where “the universal law” is to be understood as 
a universal law of nature. 
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impossible” in a world where making false promises is a universal law of nature.   
Since this maxim is not universalisable, we must conclude, from the FUL, that 
making a false promise is morally wrong.   
 
According to the FUL, we may perform similar thought-experiments such as this one 
in order to derive the duties that we have to others and to ourselves.  To determine 
whether any given action is morally permissible, all we have to do is consider what 
would happen if the maxim on which the action depends were to be a universal law of 
nature.  Any maxim that fails the universalisability test violates a duty, since Kant 
thinks that the FUL expresses “the universal imperative of duty” (G, 421, 30). 
 
Wood (1999) and Guyer (2007) point out a further feature of the FUL; that is, that it 
allows us to distinguish between perfect and imperfect duties.  A perfect duty is one 
that “permits no exception in the interest of inclination” (G, 421, 30, footnote 12).  
This means that it is a duty in the strictest possible sense – Kant‟s perfect duty to 
refrain from committing suicide applies to all people in all circumstances, and we are 
never justified in violating that duty, regardless of our inclinations.  As Kant says, one 
may never take one‟s own life, even when one is “reduced to despair by a series of 
misfortunes” and “feels sick of life” (G, 422, 30). 
 
An imperfect duty, on the other hand, allows “leeway” in its fulfilment (Russell in 
Audi, 1999:249).  Kant explains that we have a duty to develop our talents, but this 
duty is imperfect because we are able to choose which talents to develop.  For 
instance, a person might have a natural aptitude for operatic singing as well as for 
pole vaulting, but financial and time constraints might make it impossible for her to 
develop both of these talents.  She indeed has a duty not to allow her talents to be 
neglected, but, since this duty is an imperfect one, it is permissible for her to choose 
either talent to develop while neglecting the other one.  As long as she develops one 
talent and does not “indulge in pleasure rather than... improving [her] fortunate 
natural aptitudes” (G, 423, 31), she does not violate her duty by training for the pole 
vault rather than singing.  Russell (in Audi, 1999: 249) makes the distinction clear: 
“the duty to help those in need is an imperfect duty since it can be fulfilled” in many 
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ways, while “the duty to keep one‟s promises” is perfect, since it does “not allow one 
to choose which promises to keep” – we must keep them all. 
 
Kant claims that we may determine whether a duty is perfect or imperfect by making 
use of the universalisability criterion.  A duty is perfect if “the opposite cannot 
become a universal law” (LE, 29:609, 232), while it is imperfect if the opposite can 
logically be a universal law, but if we cannot consistently will that it become one.  
This distinction leads to two separate forms of the universalisability test, as Wood 
(1999: 84) explains – these are known as “the „contradiction in conception‟ (CC) and 
the „contradiction in the will‟... (CW)” tests3.  Failing the former means that a maxim 
violates a perfect duty, while failing the latter means that it violates an imperfect one 
(Wood, 1999). 
 
If a maxim fails the CC test, it means that we cannot even conceive of its being a 
universal law without contradiction.  Making false promises falls into this category.  
For our false promise to succeed, we require a world in which people habitually do 
not make false promises; otherwise, as explained previously, our promise will never 
be believed by anyone and our aim of borrowing money on the basis of a lying 
promise will be frustrated.  This is contradictory because we prescribe a rule of action 
for the rest of the world (making only true promises) while doing the opposite 
ourselves.  Thus the maxim of making false promises “cannot without contradiction 
even be thought as a universal law of nature” (G, 424, 32), which means that it 
violates a perfect duty.   
 
It seems as though most cases of lying would fail the CC test, since lying depends on 
others believing the lie to be successful.  Therefore, with lies, we generally prescribe a 
different rule of action to the rest of the world than the one we intend to follow 
ourselves.  These considerations allow Kant to reach his rigorous conclusion about 
telling the truth, since the CC test identifies it as a perfect duty. 
 
                                            
3
 As Wood (1999: 84) points out, the terminology used to name these two forms of the 
universalisability test was first devised by Onora O‟Neill.  
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Even if a maxim passes the CC test, it might still fail the CW test.  This test considers 
whether we could consistently will the maxim to be a universal law of nature – if we 
cannot, it violates an imperfect duty.  Helping others is an example of an imperfect 
duty.  There is no logical impossibility or contradiction in a world where everyone 
refuses to help those in need – we can easily envisage a society in which people never 
do anything for others.  However, Kant thinks that we could not rationally choose to 
live in such a society: “I cannot will that lovelessness should become a universal law, 
for in that case I also suffer myself”, because nobody will help me when I am in need 
(LE, 29: 609, 233).  Since we cannot will the maxim to become a universal law of 
nature, helping others is an imperfect duty.  The following passage summarises the 
application of the two tests clearly: “With perfect duties, I ask whether their maxims 
can hold good as a universal law.  But with imperfect ones, I ask whether I could also 
will that such a maxim should become a universal law” (LE, 29: 609, 232).   In a later 
section of this dissertation, I will apply the FUL to the question of lying to the 
murderer at the door in detail. 
 
The Formula of Humanity (FH) 
Kant‟s second formulation of the categorical imperative (the FH) reads as follows: 
“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” 
(G, 429, 36).  This means that we must always allow others the freedom to pursue 
their own goals without interference and treat them as rational beings capable of 
making their own choices, since “every rational being... exists as an end in [it]self and 
not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will (G, 428, 35).  For 
Kant, all our ethical duties “arise from the obligation to make each human being‟s 
capacity for autonomous choice the condition of the value of every other end” 
(Korsgaard, 1986 :331).   
 
As Guyer (2007: 90) points out, Kant is not very helpful regarding what it means to 
treat someone as an end: “Kant‟s comments... tell us a little about what it is not to 
treat a being as an end in itself, but do not tell us very much positive about what it is 
to treat someone as an end in itself.”  However, the basic idea seems to be that we 
should respect the wills of others and refrain from manipulating them.  Kant 
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emphasises that “[m]an is not a thing” (G, 429, 30) that may be used by others to 
reach their own aims; instead, “rational beings... should always be esteemed... as 
beings who must themselves be able to hold” their own ends (G, 430, 37).   
 
This understanding of what it means to treat someone as an end in herself is supported 
by Kant‟s examples.  He points out that someone who makes a false promise to repay 
money “intends to make use of another man merely as a means to an end which the 
latter does not likewise hold” (G, 429, 37).  The lender cannot share the same end as 
the borrower in this situation, since he is being deceived about what the end of the 
transaction is. Korsgaard (1986: 333) states the point clearly:  “[i]f you make a make a 
lying promise to get some money, the other person is invited to think that the end she 
is contributing to is your temporary possession of the money” when “in fact, it is your 
permanent possession of it.”   
 
In this example, the borrower is manipulating the lender in order to achieve his own 
goals, and the lender is unable to make a free, autonomous choice: she “cannot 
possibly concur with” this “way of acting toward” her (G, 429, 37) since she is 
deceived.  This is what makes the action morally impermissible, on Kant‟s view. 
Guyer (2007: 93) notes that this gives us an idea of what it means to treat others as 
ends in themselves: it is “to ensure that they retain what is essential to their own 
humanity, namely the right to set their own ends freely or to make the ends of others 
their own by freely consenting to them.”  On the FH, therefore, lying is impermissible 
because it deceives others about what the ends to which they are assenting are, 
rendering their “free consent” to them impossible. 
 
The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends (FKE) 
The final formulation of the categorical imperative requires us to regard ourselves “as 
legislator[s] in a kingdom of ends rendered possible by freedom of the will” (G, 434, 
40).  This means that we look at morality from the point of view of a lawmaker who is 
able to create the laws that govern a kingdom of which the lawmaker is himself a 
member.  The legislator must also obey the laws, since Kant describes him as 
someone who “legislates... universal laws while also being... subject to” them (G, 433, 
40).  Kant thinks that any actions that violate the laws we would make as universal 
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legislators in a kingdom aimed at protecting the autonomy of all its subjects are 
morally impermissible.  The formal statement of the FKE is as follows: “Act in 
accordance with the maxims of a member legislating universal laws for a merely 
possible kingdom of ends” (G, 439, 43). 
 
It is important to note that these laws are intended to govern the kingdom of ends, 
which is a realm with very specific features.  This kingdom of ends is “merely 
possible”, so Kant does not intend it to exist in reality, but rather in thought.   As 
Wood (1999: 166) explains, “the realm of ends... is a moral realm, the idea of which 
determines what ought to exist”.  In other words, the kingdom of ends is an ideal 
realm in which every member respects the autonomy and freedom of choice of every 
other member, so that the ends are “harmonious and reciprocally supportive”.   
 
The legislator in the kingdom of ends would, consequently, make laws to respect the 
autonomy of his subjects, aimed at the “mutual furthering of the ends of all rational 
beings in a single unified teleological system” (Wood, 1999:  166).  This means that 
the laws cannot be arbitrary – instead, the laws in the kingdom of ends must proceed 
“from reason” (Wood, 1999: 157).  It seems that the FKE can therefore be used as a 
decision-making rule, similar to the FUL.  To determine whether or not an action is 
morally permissible, we have to consider whether its underlying maxim is consistent 
with a law that we would make in our position as universal legislator of an ideal realm 
where autonomy is revered and protected.  
 
If we apply the FKE to the case of false promises, it is clear that making a lying 
promise is inconsistent with the laws that a universal legislator would make in this 
ideal realm.  Autonomy cannot be preserved if false promises are permitted, because 
lying “treats someone‟s reason as a tool” (Korsgaard, 1986: 334) – it does not permit 
her to make her own, autonomous decisions.  As we have seen earlier, the lying 
promise deprives the lender of the freedom to choose her own ends and “the deceiver 
tries to determine what levers to pull to get the desired results” (Korsgaard, 1986: 
334).  As Korsgaard (1986: 334) explains, deception cannot be permitted in the 
kingdom of ends because “it is a direct violation of autonomy”, that is, of the 
principal, sacred value of the kingdom of ends.  However, as I will explain in a later 
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section, there are some cases where violations of autonomy may be permitted, even in 
the kingdom of ends. 
 
From this exposition of Kant‟s three formulations of the categorical imperative, it 
seems that he indeed has reason to believe that lying is always morally wrong.  The 
FUL would outlaw lying because the maxim of never telling the truth cannot be 
universalised; the FH claims that it does not treat others as ends and, therefore, goes 
against their humanity; and it is incosistent with the laws of a kingdom of ends 
because it violates the principle of autonomy.  In the subsequent sections, however, I 
will argue that lying is not necessarily always incompatible with these three principles 
and that there is a strong case for believing that Kant‟s moral theory does not require 
us to tell the truth at all times.  I will consider the three formulations of the categorical 
imperative in turn, with specific reference to the case of lying to the murderer at the 
door. 
 
III.  The FUL and Lying 
As explained in the previous section, it is necessary to determine what the maxim is 
on which we act when we perform an action in order to apply the FUL to it.  Then we 
consider whether we can conceive of this maxim to be a universal law of nature, as 
well as whether we would will it to be one.  The first part of this section will be 
devoted to determining what the maxim is on which we act when we tell a lie to the 
murderer at the door.  Next, I will try to show that the relevant maxim is, indeed, 
universalisable so that the lie is permissible according to the FUL, concluding that the 
FUL does not require us to tell the truth at all times and in all situations. 
 
In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to endorse the position that there are 
different possible instances of lying and that these should be considered individually 
(MM, 6:431, 554).  For example, he asks whether “an untruth from mere politeness” 
can “be considered a lie”(MM, 6:431, 554) and claims that other lies, such as those 
that are told to cover up a crime, appear to be more serious.  It is therefore plausible to 
argue that there are different maxims underlying different instances of lying – a 
principle such as telling the truth “can be embodied... in many different ways” 
(O‟Neill, 2002: 331).  We therefore need to consider a maxim that is quite specific to 
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the case when we apply the FUL.  As Guyer (2007) notes, it is essential to specify the 
maxim with exactly the right degree of generality if we are to make use of the FUL 
meaningfully. 
 
What type of maxim meets this requirement in the case of lying to the murderer at the 
door?  It seems as though a very general maxim such as: “I shall sometimes lie” 
(hereafter abbreviated as M1) is not appropriate, since it fails to capture some morally 
relevant features of the situation.  Thomas Pogge (1998: 189) stresses that a maxim 
contains three parts: it is “an ordered triplet consisting of a type of circumstances S, a 
type of conduct C and a type of material end E”.  In this way, it can function as a 
guide for action – whenever we are under similar circumstances and have the same 
end, we propose to conduct ourselves in the way described.  
 
The maxim M1, above, omits both the end and the circumstances.  It tells us nothing 
about the conditions that hold, since the word “sometimes” is too vague.  
Furthermore, it does not express what we hope to achieve by lying – is our end to 
injure someone, to save a life or to start a nuclear war?  Intuitively, it seems as though 
we would permit the lie if it saves a life, and condemn it if it injures someone or starts 
a war.  M1 simply does not tell us enough about the circumstances surrounding our 
proposed lie for us to make a meaningful moral judgement.  As Marcus Singer (1954: 
590) points out, the categorical imperative “must always be applied to an action 
considered as taking place in certain circumstances, or for a certain purpose”. 
 
Barbara Herman (1993: 142) explains that, if our maxims are too general, then we end 
up with “rigoristic moral requirements that vitiate any hope that the [categorical 
imperative] procedure can be morally supple”.  To prevent the FUL from yielding 
moral duties that are too strict, we ought to formulate the maxims at “the correct level 
of description” (Herman, 1993: 142); that is, the level at which all the morally 
relevant features of the situation are taken into account.   
 
However, we must also guard against making our maxims too specific.  Guyer (2007) 
points out that any maxim that is highly restricted is likely to pass the 
universalisability test.  He considers a red-headed bank robber, Ignatz 
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MacGillycuddy, who proposes to act on the maxim “[a] red-haired person named 
Ignatz MacGillycuddy should rob any bank that is open north-east of his house at 5 
p.m. on any Thursday” (Guyer, 2007: 139) and shows that this maxim is 
universalisable.  The maxim passes the CC test, since there is no logical impossibility 
or contradiction that would arise if everyone were to act on it.   
 
Furthermore, the maxim even seems to pass the CW test.  There are likely to be so 
few red-headed people named Ignatz MacGillycuddy with banks north-east of their 
houses that, even if each of them were to act on the maxim, there would not be 
enough bank robberies “to bring down the whole banking system” (Guyer, 2007: 139) 
or to put even one bank out of business.  It therefore seems as though this very 
specific maxim can be universalised successfully, but this result is problematic 
because we would ordinarily say that most instances of bank robbery are morally 
impermissible (assuming there are no mitigating circumstances that might need to be 
considered). 
 
From the preceding discussion it is clear that the maxim that applies to the case of 
lying to the murderer at the door can be neither too general nor too specific.  I propose 
that the maxim “Whenever I sincerely believe that telling a lie is necessary to save 
someone‟s life, I will lie to prevent that person‟s death” (M2) is a suitable one.  It 
meets Pogge‟s (1998) requirements of having a set of circumstances (“whenever I 
sincerely believe that telling a lie is necessary to save someone‟s life”), a type of 
conduct (“I will lie”) and a material end (“to prevent that person‟s death”).  Moreover, 
this maxim is not a general action description that would yield undesirably strict 
duties (such as M1 is), but it is also not so specific that it will automatically pass the 
CC and CW tests (as the bank robber‟s maxim will).  Having expressed the maxim in 
this way, we are now in a position to apply the CC and CW tests to it to determine 
whether or not it is universalisable. 
 
First, it seems plausible to argue that M2 passes the CC test.  Although the success of 
the lie depends on its being believed, the world in which M2 is universalised is not 
one in which people routinely lie.  In this world, statements would generally be 
believed, because people would tell the truth unless they sincerely believed that a lie 
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would save another person‟s life.  Lies would, therefore, only occur under very 
specific circumstances, and it seems reasonable to think that situations in which 
telling lies could save lives are likely to be rare.  It does not seem as though adopting 
M2 would undermine the institutions of making promises, drawing up contracts and 
everyday discourse (which require habitual truth-telling for their success). 
 
This result seems satisfactory, because it squares with how human beings generally 
view the requirement to tell the truth.  Usually, we accept that people are truthful 
except under extraordinary circumstances, and we generally believe their utterances 
even though we are aware that they sometimes tell lies.  The fact that these 
circumstances exist does not cause us to disbelieve everything we are told and there 
is, therefore, no inherent contradiction in adopting M2.   
 
Maxims that fail the CC test end up being self-defeating, as Wood (1999: 89) 
explains, because the universalisation of these maxims “would simply render it 
impossible to achieve one‟s ends” by acting on them.  For instance, if the maxim of 
making a lying promise to repay money one has borrowed whenever one is in 
financial difficulties were to be universalised, it would never be possible to attain 
money by acting on that maxim; “nobody would trust to a promise, or therefore do 
anything because of it” and “promising would abolish itself, and thus automatically 
cease” (LE, 29:608, 232).  
 
Thus, the success of the lying promise depends on its being the case that the maxim of 
making such promises is not a universal law of nature.  In order for someone to 
believe me when I say that I will repay the money, it must be that people generally 
keep their promises to return money that they borrow.  Certainly, nobody would lend 
me money if they knew that everyone habitually made idle promises to gain money 
with no intention of keeping them – crucially, the promise can only succeed in a 
world where its underlying maxim is not a universal law, which leads to a 
contradiction.  For the action to succeed, I must be the only person who acts on that 
maxim, so it cannot be universalised.  As Kant says, someone “who fails to keep his 
promise does not will that this should become a universal law; he merely wishes to 
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exempt himself alone from this law” (LE, 29: 608, 232) while, paradoxically, 
expecting everyone else to obey it.   
 
The success of an action based on M2, on the other hand, does not require others not 
to adopt the maxim.  I may achieve my aim of saving my friend‟s life by lying to the 
murderer if it M2 is a universal law of nature, since other people would generally 
believe my utterances except under the very special conditions where they knew for 
certain that I sincerely believed that someone‟s life was in danger.  The murderer has 
no cause to disbelieve what I say when I tell him that my friend is not at home, since 
people would generally be truthful in a world where M2 is universalised.  Thus 
universalising M2 would not undermine the success of actions based on it (whereas 
universalising other maxims that fail the CC test would). 
 
One might argue, however, that lying might not be successful in saving the victim‟s 
life in a world where M2 was a universal law of nature.  The murderer at the door 
would also be governed by M2, so he would know that people usually tell lies when 
they believe that doing so could save someone else‟s life.  If I then lie to the murderer 
regarding my friend‟s whereabouts, he will probably not believe me, since everyone 
would lie under these conditions!   In a world where M2 is a universal law of nature, 
it therefore seems as though telling the truth to the murderer might, paradoxically, be 
more effective in saving her life than lying to him.  Perhaps, then, M2 cannot be 
universalised without contradiction after all. 
 
However, this argument depends on the assumption that the murderer has perfect 
knowledge regarding my beliefs.  M2 states that I would lie only when I sincerely 
believe that the lie would save my friend‟s life – however, the murderer is unlikely to 
know that I believe this, assuming he does not knock on my door and say, “I have 
come to kill your friend – is she here?”.  If he simply came to the door and asked if 
my friend was in, he would believe my lie unless he knew for certain that I was aware 
that he was intending to murder her.  And if he did know this for certain, asking me 
about my friend‟s whereabouts would be a meaningless exercise for him, as he would 
know that I would lie to him anyway.   Thus this argument does not show that 
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adopting M2 leads to a contradiction, and it seems plausible to claim that this maxim 
passes the CC test. 
 
We now consider the CW test – can we consistently will a world in which M2 is a 
universal law of nature?  Would we assent to living in a world where people routinely 
lie when they sincerely believe that doing so could save an innocent life?  I certainly 
think that it is reasonable to say that we would.  It seems rational to say that we would 
agree to live in a world where there is a chance of being lied to when we know that 
the lies are intended to save the lives of others. 
 
Herman (1993: 50-51) suggests that we should supplement “the Kantian procedure 
with [John Rawls‟] veil of ignorance” when applying the categorical imperative to 
moral judgements.  This means that, when we decide whether or not we could will 
M2 to be a universal law, we do not know whether we will end up being the liar, the 
would-be murderer or the intended victim in the world in which M2 holds; so we 
must examine the consequences of acting on M2 from the viewpoints of all three of 
them.   
 
Telling the truth to the murderer would have devastating consequences for the victim 
(her death), and perhaps also for the person telling the truth (guilt and regret at 
contributing to her murder), while the murderer would be able to fulfil his goal of 
killing her and would not be harmed.  Lying, on the other hand, would save the life of 
the victim while frustrating the aims of the murderer, but this might even be beneficial 
to the latter as he could be spared a lengthy and undesirable prison sentence.  It 
therefore seems reasonable to say that the comparative inconvenience caused to the 
murderer by the lie is a much better outcome than the loss of life resulting from telling 
the truth.  If we were in the position of the victim, we would certainly will the lie to 
be told – therefore, it seems as though M2 passes the CW test.  
 
Once again, this result is consistent with the way in which we normally view lies.  We 
usually do not blame people who lie under extraordinary circumstances.  For example, 
when lies are told in order to avoid insulting someone, to arrange a surprise party or to 
play a practical joke, the liar is generally not regarded as morally reprehensible – 
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instead, the special conditions surrounding the lie are taken into account.  A lie to 
save someone‟s life certainly appears to fall into this category, and it follows that we 
are able to consistently will a maxim such as M2 to become a universal law.  We 
might argue that a world in which lies are sometimes told, with the aim of saving lives 
or arranging surprise parties, is preferable to one where everyone always tells the 
truth.  Thus I feel that our maxim M2 is indeed universalisable, which means that 
telling a lie to save a life is permissible on the FUL.  This version of the categorical 
imperative does not, therefore, require Kant to maintain that lying is always wrong. 
 
One might object to this conclusion by pointing out that M2 is specified in such a way 
that it cannot fail the CC and CW tests – in other words, we have tailored it to get the 
answer that we want.  This is a familiar objection to the categorical imperative: as 
Guyer (2007: 139) notes, the FUL is problematic because it “yields so many false 
positives, that is, maxims that should be impermissible on any reasonable view of 
morality but that turn out to be permissible”.  Because “any particular action could be 
performed under an indefinite number of different maxims” (Guyer, 2007: 141), it 
seems as though we merely have to fashion the maxim in the correct way in order to 
obtain the desired result.  If we want a given action to turn out to be permissible, all 
we have to do is devise a maxim that plausibly describes the action, but clearly passes 
the CC and CW tests.  Wood (1999: 103) points out that a maxim may conceivably be 
described “in such detail... that its becoming a universal law of nature would 
foreseeably have no consequences” besides one‟s person acting on it “on this 
particular occasion”, so that an application of the FUL might justify an obviously 
immoral action. 
 
This point may be clarified in considering a further maxim (M3) that may be used to 
describe the action of lying to the murderer at the door.  I specify M3 as follows:  
“Whenever I am in a position to lie to someone, I will lie in order to deceive that 
person”.  Now suppose that I have an intense desire to deceive others whenever 
possible, and my only motivation in lying to the murderer is from the satisfaction I 
will gain from misleading him.  Here, I do not care whether or not he kills my friend, 
and I do not lie out of any concern for her safety – perhaps I would lie to him even if 
the lie directly lead to the victim‟s death.   
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If we now apply the FUL to M3, it seems obvious that it will fail the CC test in the 
same way that making a lying promise to get money would.  Nobody would believe 
my lie if it was a universal law of nature for everyone to deceive others and my action 
would be self-defeating.  Consequently, actions based on M3 are morally 
impermissible, according to the FUL.  This means that lying to the murderer is wrong 
if we act on M3, while it is permissible (or even obligatory) if we act on M2.  As a 
result, the morality of an action seems to depend on nothing more than the way in 
which its underlying maxim is specified. 
 
This means that our ability to use the FUL requires us to know whether an action is 
right or wrong beforehand, so that we can adapt the maxim to fit our intuitions, and 
this questions the efficacy of the FUL as a decision-making rule.  If we already know 
whether or not an action is permissible, and if we are able to tailor the maxim in order 
to get the desired result, it seems as though any attempt to use the FUL is futile.  The 
difference between acting on M2 and acting on M3 is that our intention is to save a 
life in the former case and to deceive in the latter.  Concluding that acts based on M2 
are permissible while those based on M3 are not presupposes that we know already 
that saving a life is a noble aim while deceiving others is reprehensible – as such, 
using the FUL to determine that one action is right while the other is wrong is nothing 
more than circular reasoning. 
 
This objection to the FUL is indeed a powerful one.  As Wood (1999: 105) explains, 
the FUL is “not enough” – we “need a further specification of the moral laws 
themselves that” it “is commanding us not to violate” and the categorical imperative 
itself is not adequate for this purpose.  However, we may overcome this difficulty if 
we see the FUL not as a decision-making rule, but rather as an explaining feature 
underlying all right action.  In other words, the FUL does not determine whether or 
not an action is right, but rather provides us with a justification for its rightness.  It is 
an objective standard to which we appeal when explaining why a given action 
(already known, perhaps intuitively, to be wrong) is impermissible under a specific set 
of circumstances.  This view of the categorical imperative, which is the one proposed 
by Stratton-Lake (2000), Timmermann (2007) and Hanna (2009), will be discussed in 
more detail in section VI of this dissertation. 
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A further objection to the preceding analysis of the FUL is the claim that the 
categorical imperative should not be applied in a consequentialist way.  In considering 
whether M2 is universalisable, we are examining the likely consequences of telling 
the lie for the murderer, the liar and the intended victim – we therefore draw our 
conclusions based on consequences, as a different moral theory like utilitarianism 
would.  This is objectionable because Kantian ethics requires us to consider the action 
itself, independently of its consequences, so one might argue that this way of drawing 
the conclusion is mistaken. 
 
This objection fails because the application of the categorical imperative does not 
depend on the consequences of a particular action; rather, the conclusion is drawn 
from a thought-experiment that considers the result of an action-type.  This is why we 
consider a general maxim on which the action rests instead of the act itself.  We do 
not know what the consequences of the action will be – at best, we have a belief about 
what the likely result of lying to the murderer will be.  It is with this end (the 
preserving of the victim‟s life) in mind that we perform the action, and the categorical 
imperative is applied to actions of the same type under the same circumstances, 
intended to achieve the same end.  We imagine everyone habitually performing 
actions based on the maxim, not the consequences of one person acting on it in a 
given set of circumstances. 
 
Kant emphasises the point that we do not know the consequences of our actions in 
advance:  “whoever tells a lie... must answer for the consequences resulting 
therefrom... regardless of how unforeseen... [they] may be” (RL, 427, 65).  The 
universalisation of M2 does not require that we know the result of telling a lie to the 
murderer in a specific case.  Instead, the universalisability test considers what would, 
in general, happen if lies were usually told with the aim of saving lives. 
 
Kant points out that my act of lying to the murderer might actually cause the death of 
my friend.  If I tell the murderer that my friend is not at home and she “has... 
(unbeknownst to [me]) gone out” (RL, 427, 65), the murderer might leave, find her 
outside and kill her.  My lie has therefore contributed to the death of my friend and I 
“may be justly accused of having caused” the murder (RL, 427, 65).  This shows that 
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morality should not depend on consequences, since these are so uncertain – the best 
we can do is to act on acceptable maxims.  If we have adhered to the demands of duty, 
it is reasonable to think that we should not be blamed for the unforeseen consequences 
that result from our actions.  Thus the Kantian application of the categorical 
imperative is not a consequentialist one and the objection to it is unfounded.  Since it 
considers the desirability of universalising an action type instead of the likely 
consequences of a specific action, the FUL will still allow us to act morally even if 
our actions end up having undesirable consequences that we could not have foreseen.  
 
Importantly, Kant makes use of the fact that my lie could cause the victim‟s death to 
draw the conclusion that lying is impermissible.  He says that “a well-intentioned lie 
can become punishable in accordance with civil law because of an accident” while “if 
you have adhered strictly to the truth, public justice cannot lay a hand on you” (RL, 
427, 65).  Thus Kant thinks that I may be punished if lying to the murderer causes the 
victim‟s death (as described previously), but not if telling the truth results in her 
killing – in the latter case, I do nothing wrong as I fulfil my duty of truthfulness, 
whereas I may be regarded as an accessory to the murder in the former.  This means 
that I should tell the truth to the murderer, because nobody would punish me for 
causing my friend‟s death by being truthful. 
 
I think that Kant is mistaken in drawing this conclusion.  First, the number of cases 
where telling a “well-intentioned lie” (RL, 427, 65) will have unforeseen, negative 
consequences is likely to be comparatively small.  It seems reasonable to claim that 
the lie to the murderer will probably succeed in most cases, and that the exceptional 
cases do not mean that the lie is impermissible.  In the same way, my action of driving 
to buy groceries could result in a car accident whereby a pedestrian is harmed; 
however, the fact that such an accident is possible does not render it morally wrong 
for me to drive to the store.  The intention behind telling the lie is a noble one, since 
we sincerely believe that our lie can save an innocent life if we act on M2, whereas 
telling the truth appears to betray our friend.   
 
Thus it is difficult to agree with Kant‟s view that we should tell the truth merely 
because we cannot be punished for doing so in a court of law.  We might counter, 
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with Singer (1954: 584), that telling the truth in this situation would be wrong 
“because it would help destroy the bonds of human trust, in terms of which one 
person may be relied on to shield the other against an oppressor.”    
 
Furthermore, Singer (1954: 584) claims that Kant‟s conclusion that it would be wrong 
to lie is “question-begging”.   Kant says that lying to the murderer would be morally 
wrong because “it does harm to humanity in general, inasmuch as it vitiates the very 
source of right” (RL, 426, 64-65).  In other words, telling a lie is impermissible 
because it is morally wrong – but “whether it would be wrong is precisely the point in 
question” (Singer, 1954: 584).  This certainly seems to be a valid criticism of Kant‟s 
conclusion. 
 
We have another reason for disagreeing with Kant‟s conclusion if we consider the 
maxim on which telling the truth to the murderer depends.  This would be the 
opposite maxim to M2, which can reasonably be formulated as “Whenever I sincerely 
believe that telling a lie is necessary to save someone‟s life, I will tell the truth to 
respect people‟s freedom to choose their own ends, thereby putting the life of an 
innocent person in danger” (M4).  On this maxim, the circumstances are the same as 
in M2, but the conduct and end are somewhat different.  The end of M4 is to respect 
the free choices of others at all times (even when this endangers another human 
being); it cannot be to put someone else‟s life in danger, since intentionally exposing 
someone to danger cannot be a reasonable end to adopt when formulating a maxim.  
Now, if M4 fails either the CC or CW tests, then, by the FUL, it is our duty to act on 
the maxim that is its opposite (in this case, M2).  This would mean that we are 
morally required to lie to the murderer at the door. 
 
It should be obvious that M4 does not fail the CC test.  There is no contradiction 
involved in a world where everyone routinely tells the truth, even when doing so can 
endanger someone else‟s life.  We can logically conceive of such a world4, and there 
                                            
4
 A recent film titled The Invention of Lying (2009), by Gervais and Robinson (Focus Features 
International Films) portrays a world in which everyone routinely tells the truth and nobody has ever 
lied.  The writers are able to imagine and create such a fictional world on film, which shows that there 
is no logical impossibility precluding its existence. 
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are certainly no institutions such as promising that are undermined by adopting M4 as 
a universal law of nature.   
 
Turning to the CW test, can we consistently will that M4 be adopted as a universal 
law of nature?  As noted previously, the adoption of this maxim will most likely 
destroy bonds of trust between people (Singer, 1954), which is undesirable.  
Furthermore, adopting M4 will mean that the murderer is able to get any information 
from us that might assist his projects, since we are bound to answer any of his 
questions truthfully.  He might ask, for example, “When is your friend at her most 
vulnerable?” or “When is she going to be alone here in the house?”  Honest answers 
to questions such as these will certainly aid the murderer in achieving his goals, and it 
does not seem as though we could rationally will a world in which people routinely 
assist murderers through such extreme honesty. 
 
If we follow Herman‟s (1993) suggestion of approaching the question from behind a 
veil of ignorance, we also see that we could not will M4 to be a universal law.  As 
with M2, we must examine the situation from the point of view of all three parties 
concerned.  It is hard to see how we could, as possible victims of murders, 
consistently will our friends to co-operate with our killers and give our location away.  
Instead, we would in all likelihood will that our friends lie on our behalf – in fact, the 
only person who could reasonably will the truth to be told in this case is the murderer.  
Therefore, willing M2 as a universal law of nature seems far more rational than 
willing M4, so M4 seems to fail the CW test.  This means that, based on the FUL, 
lying to the murderer emerges as an imperfect duty to our friend.  Thus Kant‟s moral 
theory does not require him to arrive at the strict conclusion that lying is always 
wrong, and the case of the murderer at the door appears to be an exception. 
 
Two other cases are worth exploring here.  What if the liar is under oath, and knows 
that telling the truth is likely to result in an innocent person‟s being convicted of a 
crime and executed because of circumstantial evidence?  This case seems to be 
similar to that of the murderer at the door, as a lie can save the life of an innocent 
person.  However, there is the crucial difference that the lie must be told under oath in 
a court of law.  Does this additional feature of the case make the lie impermissible? 
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Here, Wood‟s (2009) emphasis on Kant‟s distinction between a “lie” and a 
“falsiloquium” in the Lectures on Ethics appears to be relevant.  A “lie” is “the only 
kind of untruth... that directly infringes upon another‟s right” (MM, 6: 238, 394, 
footnote), whereas a “falsiloquium” (or falsification) is an untruth that “violates no 
duty of right” (Wood, 2009: 4).  This means that a lie is properly understood as an 
untruth where the hearer has a right to the truth (such as in contracts); or, as Wood 
(2009: 4-5) describes it, as a false “declaration”, that is, a false “statement that occurs 
in a context where others are authorized... to rely on the truth”.  A falsification, on the 
other hand, is a false statement where the speaker “is merely communicating his 
thoughts to” the audience and “it is entirely up to them whether they want to believe 
him or not” (MM, 6: 238, 394).  The crucial distinction between the two is whether or 
not others “are authorized to rely upon” them (Wood, 2009: 5) – a lie occurs only in 
situations where we make a false declaration when others can reasonably expect us to 
tell the truth.  If this requirement is not met, the statement is a mere falsification. 
 
When the murderer at the door asks whether my friend is in, it seems as though he is 
not authorised to rely on my information.  I am not under oath, there is no legal 
contract between us and I am not seeking to “deprive” him “of something that is 
rightfully his” (Wood, 2009: 5).  This means that it is “up to him” whether he wants to 
believe me or not, and he has no inherent right to a declaration from me. My 
statement that my friend is not home is, therefore, a falsification rather than a lie and, 
as we have seen, Kant‟s moral theory permits us to tell an untruth to the murderer 
under these conditions. 
 
A declaration in a court of law, on the other hand, is a situation where others (that is, 
the judge and jury) are authorised to hear the truth from us.  As Wood (2009: 5) points 
out, such a declaration “makes the speaker liable by right, and thus often liable to 
criminal penalties or civil damages if what is said is knowingly false.”  Kant himself 
considers false declarations under oath to be impermissible, noting that a perjurer “by 
his deceit removes all credit and worth from the instrumentum of public trust, and 
commits a greater crime than any wrought by open force” (LE, 27: 701, 427).  This 
quotation from Kant shows that a universal law permitting perjury would fail the CW 
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test, since the removal of “all credit and worth” from the justice system is surely not 
something that we could consistently will.   
 
Thus it seems as though the FUL permits us to lie to a murderer to prevent the death 
of an innocent, but not to lie under oath in a court.  The relevant difference between 
the cases is that the court requires us to make a declaration, or a truthful statement, 
while the murderer has no such claim on us.  Falsifications are sometimes 
permissible, whereas lying declarations are not.  This certainly seems to be a plausible 
conclusion. 
 
Schapiro (2006) provides a counterexample to this case, where someone is required to 
make a declaration in Nazi Germany.  Here, the person requiring the declaration is a 
bona fide government official who is searching for Jews to exterminate.  He knocks 
on my door asking whether there are any Jews in the house and, since he is a 
representative of the government, he is authorised to rely on the information I 
provide.  Am I required to tell him about the innocent Jew hiding in my cellar, when I 
know that he will murder her and when I do not support the Nazi government?  In this 
situation, it seems as though the official is entitled to expect the truth from me, and a 
false statement on my behalf will amount to a lie (and not a mere falsification). 
 
However, the key feature of this case is that the official represents a corrupt, evil 
government whose policy of killing Jews cannot be justified.   As Schapiro (2006: 52) 
explains, the Nazi official‟s “end is blatantly at odds with” Kantian ideals, even 
though he is being honest about his intentions.  Adopting a maxim such as “Whenever 
I am in a position where I have to make a declaration to an obviously evil 
government, and I sincerely believe that a lie is necessary to save someone‟s life, I 
will lie to prevent that person‟s death” (M5) does not seem to fail the CW test – if the 
government is indeed “obviously evil”, it seems as though we could will a world in 
which people routinely commit perjury to save the lives of those whom the state 
persecutes.   
 
This counterexample appears to provide a case where making even a false declaration 
might be permissible on the FUL.  Even if this argument is not entirely convincing, 
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Schapiro (2006) shows that lying to the Nazi is permissible on the third formulation of 
the categorical imperative (FKE), an argument that I shall consider in the fourth 
section of this paper.  However, it seems clear that there are at least some cases where 
the FUL permits lying, so Kant‟s conclusion that lies are never permissible appears to 
be too hasty. 
 
One problem with this counterexample is that we might be required to tell the truth, 
even to an evil government, because we have a duty to obey the state at all times.  
Peter Nicholson (1976: 215) attributes this view to Kant: “it is my contention that he 
regards both not lying and not resisting the sovereign as absolute moral duties”.  This 
is the case even if the government is corrupt and unjust.  As Kant explains, citizens of 
a state “cannot offer any resistance to the legislative head of state” since “a people has 
a duty to put up with even what is held to be an unbearable abuse of supreme 
authority” (MM, 6: 320, 463).  On this view, both the duty to tell the truth and the 
duty not to resist the state permit of no exceptions whatsoever, and the 
counterexample of Nazi Germany fails. 
 
There are, however, some difficulties with attributing this rigorous view to Kant.  
First, as Schwarz (1964: 127) explains, we may distinguish between “active” and 
“negative” resistance.  Here, “active” resistance refers to deliberate acts taken to 
“compel the government to a certain procedure”, such as an armed revolution to 
overthrow the state, while “negative” resistance is merely a “refusal of the people... to 
comply with the demands” of the government.  Since lying to the Nazi officer 
constitutes a refusal to comply with his demands rather than coercing him to act in a 
certain way, it is a form of “negative” resistance.   
 
Schwarz (1964: 130) claims that Kant would permit citizens to engage in negative 
resistance and shows that we “can quote passages that clearly exonerate Kant from 
any charge of having deprived the individual citizen of a right of resistance” and 
provides a number of citations from Kant‟s works to support this view.  Perhaps, 
therefore, Kant‟s prohibition of resisting the state applies only to active resistance, so 
that we are “not justified in killing a tyrant in order to preserve the lives of... even 
millions of his subjects” (Beck, 1971: 420), but it may be permissible to lie to a 
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representative of an unjust government as this is a negative form of resistance 
involving non-compliance rather than aggressive rebellion. 
 
A second reason for thinking that Kant might allow us to lie to the Nazi official is 
that, in Kant‟s times, citizens of unjust states could emigrate easily relative to those 
living under modern tyrants.  As Schwarz (1964: 130) points out, a “terrorized 
individual” of Kant‟s age, “persecuted by a despotic ruler, usually had to travel only a 
few miles to enter the province of another sovereign, out of reach of the raging ruler”.  
Since Kant thinks that any subject of a state “has the right to emigrate, for the state 
could not hold him back as its property” (MM, 6:338, 478), he would probably 
suggest that someone who felt persecuted by her ruler should simply move if she did 
not wish to obey the law, and this would not be as difficult as it was for those who 
wished to escape Nazi Germany.    
 
Since Kant values human autonomy as an ideal, he would perhaps advocate resistance 
to governments that greatly limit freedom, such as the North Korean one, which did 
not exist in his times.  Reiss (1956: 190) emphasises this point, explaining that Kant 
“could not have foreseen the modern totalitarian state which is much worse than 
anarchy” and that his call for us to obey the state, while relevant to the times in which 
he lived, is perhaps not applicable to our present-day world.  Thus I feel that the 
counterexample is valid – it is not clear that Kant would condemn someone who lies 
to a Nazi judge and, even if he would, his commandment to obey the state at all times 
is perhaps outdated when dealing with some of the despotic governments of today. 
 
A further objection to this counterexample and to the other aforementioned cases 
might be that they are invalid because they are all instances where the perfect duty of 
telling the truth conflicts with an imperfect duty to others.  As Kant points out, 
“imperfect duties always succumb to perfect ones” (LE, 27: 537, 296) – we always 
have to fulfil our perfect duties, but “failure to fulfil[-]” our imperfect duties “is not in 
itself culpability... but rather mere deficiency in moral worth” (MM, 6:390, 521).  
Kant thinks that telling the truth is a perfect duty we have to ourselves (“the greatest 
violation of a human being‟s duty to himself... is the contrary of truthfulness, lying”, 
MM, 6:429, 552).  This is because, as explained earlier, the maxim of lying (in 
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general) fails the CC test because telling a lie successfully is impossible in a world 
where everyone routinely lies.   
 
Thus it might be argued that we face a conflict between the perfect duty to tell the 
truth and the imperfect duty not to harm others in the case of the murderer at the door.  
Since the former takes precedence over the latter, we ought nevertheless to tell the 
truth despite the possible consequences of doing so.  Here, it is regrettable that the 
situation requires us to breach an imperfect duty to others, but it remains obligatory to 
tell the truth to the murderer in order to respect his agency – the duty of truthfulness 
may never be violated.   However, even if this consideration means that maxims M2 
through M5 are not universalisable, we may provide one final counterexample that 
appears to show that the FUL permits instances of lying. 
 
Schapiro‟s (2006) example may be modified so that it plausibly leads to a conflict 
between two perfect duties to oneself.  Suppose that a Nazi judge asks me (a Jew) 
under oath what my religion is.  I know that the judge will order my immediate 
execution if I tell the truth, but I also know that a lie will set me free since there is no 
evidence to prove that I am a Jew apart from my response to this question.  The 
dilemma here is whether I should tell the truth and allow the Nazis to kill me, or to lie 
and prolong my life, while violating a perfect duty to myself to be truthful in all 
interactions with others. 
 
Kant claims that every person has a duty “to himself as an animal being... to preserve 
himself” (MM, 6: 421).  In other words, one should take the necessary steps to stay 
alive, insofar as this is possible.  It looks as though the prima facie duty to tell the 
truth is inconsistent with this prima facie duty to preserve my own existence, since I 
will effectively be signing my own death warrant unless I lie.  I might choose to act 
on the following maxim: “Whenever I am in a position where I have to make a 
declaration to an obviously evil government, and I sincerely believe that a lie is 
necessary to save my own life, I will tell the truth in order to respect people‟s freedom 
to choose their own ends, thereby putting my life in danger” (M5) and tell the judge 
that I am a Jew. 
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It may be argued that this maxim fails the CC test.  If my aim in telling the truth to the 
evil judge is to respect people‟s freedom to choose their own ends, and if the 
consequence is that I am executed or imprisoned, then I will fail to achieve my aim 
because my ability to choose my own ends must necessarily cease if I am no longer 
alive, or at least be significantly hampered if I am imprisoned.  On the one hand, I 
promote the autonomy of others by telling the truth; on the other, I allow my own 
freedom to be constrained.  The maxim of telling the truth at the same time upholds 
the autonomy of others while severely limiting or even destroying my own autonomy.  
It is surely plausible to argue that there is a contradiction in adopting, for the sake of 
autonomy, a maxim that is likely to result in the loss of one‟s own autonomy.  Thus 
M5 appears to fail the CC test, as it threatens the very value that it seeks to preserve, 
which is a contradiction.   
 
Furthermore, a premature death will prevent me from continuing to fulfil some of my 
“many other actual duties” identified by Kant (G, 424, 32), such as cultivating my 
talents or helping others in need.  These are impossible to fulfil if I am no longer 
alive.  Kant explains that “several... duties outweigh a single one” (LE, 27: 537, 296).  
This means that, if circumstances demand a choice between fulfilling only the prima 
facie perfect duty of telling the truth or fulfilling both the prima facie perfect duty of 
self-preservation and the imperfect duty of developing my talents, I should choose the 
action that fulfils the larger number of duties.   
 
It therefore seems as though we are morally required to lie in this situation, even 
though the duty not to lie remains and it is deplorable that we are unable to fulfil it.  
However, in this unfortunate case, “it is absolutely impossible to fulfil both duties”, so 
we ought to tell a lie “since the ground of [self-preservation] binds more strongly than 
that of” truthfulness (LE, 27: 537, 296-297).  As Schwarz (1964: 129) explains, 
“commands which place a person in direct conflict with the law of freedom so that 
their observance would annihilate him as a person... must be resisted” even if they are 
the law of the country.  From the FUL, then, it seems as though we are justified in 
telling a lie to the Nazi judge to save our own life under these circumstances, even if 
we break the law by doing so. 
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This conclusion, however, is not yet satisfactory.  As Wood (1999) notes, there are 
several problems with the use of the categorical imperative in the FUL.  He claims 
that we should see the FUL as a “merely provisional” formulation of Kant‟s ethical 
thought and that it is an intermediate step toward the fuller moral law expressed in the 
other two formulations (Wood, 1999: 97).  According to Christine Korsgaard (1986: 
347), the FH is a more sophisticated and rigorous principle than the FUL, and can 
lead to different conclusions.  Thus, even though the FUL seems to lend support to the 
view that lying is permissible under some circumstances, we have to investigate 
further by considering the other two formulations of the categorical imperative. 
 
IV.  The FH and Lying 
Both Korsgaard (1986) and Herman (1993) emphasise that, on the FH, lying is 
impermissible because telling a lie to another person means that we are not treating 
her with the respect due to all human beings; or, in Kant‟s terminology, we fail to 
treat her as an end.  Korsgaard (1986: 331) explains the point clearly – when we 
deceive others, we interfere with their ability to choose their own ends and violate 
their “capacity for autonomous choice”.  We treat them simply as mere means to our 
own ends (which they cannot share as they are deceived regarding what they are) and 
this is disrespectful and impermissible. 
 
One possible response to this view is that we are entitled to treat the murderer at the 
door as a mere means to an end because he has evil purposes, so that he does not have 
any right to hear the truth.  This is the original objection to Kant‟s views from 
Benjamin Constant (1797) that prompted Kant to write the Right to Lie (Benton, 
1982).  On Constant‟s view, duties “correspond to the rights of others” and, in a place 
“where there are no rights, there are no duties” (Constant, 1797: 36, my own 
translation)
5
.  Constant thinks that the murderer has given up any rights he has to hear 
the truth, so that we no longer have a duty to be truthful to him (although we still have 
other duties to him such as a duty not to harm him, for instance).  However, this 
objection fails because it misunderstands the key point that we are required to tell the 
                                            
5
 The original French passage is “L‟idée de devoir est inséparable de celle de droits : un devoir est ce 
qui... correspond aux droits d‟un autre.  Là où il n‟y a pas de droits, il n‟y a pas de devoirs”.  
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truth to the murderer not because of any rights he has, but rather because lying to him 
violates a perfect duty we have to ourselves. 
 
Kant argues this point by saying that “the expression „to have a right to the truth‟ is 
meaningless” (RL, 426, 64).  The murderer at the door is not in a position to require a 
true declaration from us, because nobody has “objectively a right to truth”; this means 
that “by telling an untruth I do no wrong to him who unjustly compels me to make 
this statement” (RL, 426, 64).  Instead, the wrong I do arises as a violation of duty, 
that is, I fail to treat other people in the way I ought to.   
 
Consequently, the lie does not harm the murderer individually, but is instead “a wrong 
done to mankind in general” (RL, 426, 64).   The purposes of the murderer are 
irrelevant to what we ought to do – treating him as an end requires that we allow him 
the freedom to set his own goals, no matter how evil they may be.  Failure to do so 
violates the principle of humanity that is central to Kantian ethics, and on these 
grounds the lie is impermissible.  Constant‟s objection to Kant‟s position therefore 
fails, because it is based on a misunderstanding of his theory. 
 
A much better response is the argument developed by Korsgaard (1986) and Schapiro 
(2003; 2006).  Korsgaard (1986: 341) distinguishes between “ideal and nonideal 
theory”.  Ideal theory assumes that “everyone will act justly” so that “the ideal” of a 
“just state of affairs” is possible (Korsgaard, 1986: 342).  Under ideal conditions, 
then, it is assumed that others will be ethical - “people, nature and history will behave 
themselves so that the ideal can be realised” (Korsgaard, 1986: 342).  As I have 
shown previously, lying would be abhorrent in such an ideal world since it would not 
permit others to choose their own ends, thereby disrespecting their humanity.  As 
Korsgaard (1986: 333) explains, applying the FH under these ideal conditions means 
that lying is one of “the most fundamental forms of wrongdoing to others”, such is its 
disrespect for humanity. 
 
Non-ideal cases, on the other hand, arise when we can no longer make the assumption 
that others will be ethical.  This means that we become faced with difficult moral 
choices so that doing what would ordinarily be the right thing appears undesirable.  
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Korsgaard (1986: 343) explains that, under non-ideal conditions, it is impossible to 
realise the ideal of justice – instead, the best we are able to do under these conditions 
is to follow whichever one “of our nonideal options is least bad, closest to ideal 
conduct”.   
 
On this analysis, then, the case of the murderer at the door is governed by non-ideal 
conditions.  The intentions of the murderer are evil, and he is likely to deceive us as to 
what they are – Korsgaard (1986: 329) explains that he “must suppose that you do not 
know who he and what he has in mind”, so that “there is probably already deception 
in the case”.  Thus, the ideal assumption that others will always act ethically no longer 
applies, and we are justified in lying to the murderer because he “tries to use [our] 
honesty as a tool” and we “do not have to passively submit to being used as a means” 
to the murderer‟s own, evil ends (Korsgaard, 1986: 338).      
 
Korsgaard (1986: 338) notes that Kant seems to permit lying when conditions are not 
ideal, explaining that “this is the line that Kant takes”.  Kant says that “if, in all cases, 
we were to remain faithful to every detail of the truth, we might often expose 
ourselves to the wickedness of others who wanted to abuse our truthfulness” (LE, 27: 
448, 204).  We are required always to tell the truth only under the ideal conditions 
where everyone is “well disposed” – sadly, however, “men are malicious” and the 
world is non-ideal (LE, 27: 448, 204).  This means that we are permitted to tell “a 
„necessary lie‟... where someone forcibly compels [us] to make a declaration of which 
[we] know they will make wrongful use” (Wood, 2009: 12).  Here, the lie is justified 
because it is “a weapon of defence” and protects us from having our own humanity 
disrespected by others (LE, 27: 448, 204).  Korsgaard (1986: 340) makes the even 
stronger point that we are obligated to tell a lie to the murderer as we “owe it to 
humanity not to allow [-]our honesty to be used as a resource for evil.” 
 
Schapiro (2003 and 2006: 49) argues along similar lines, claiming that there are cases 
where “mitigating circumstances” apply and where we may engage in “defensive 
deception” to prevent ourselves from being used as a mere means by others.  Lies are 
also justified when we lie to “very young children or the mentally disabled”, which 
Schapiro (2006: 38) calls “paternalistic deception”.  Since very young children and 
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mentally ill people are not rational, we may deceive them for their own good, as such 
deception does not interfere with “their rightful authority to govern” themselves 
(Schapiro, 2006: 38).  Very young children or the mentally disabled are not able to 
make good choices, since they are not completely rational.   
Thus, an act of deceiving such people for their own good does not violate the FH‟s 
directive to respect autonomy, since they lack autonomy to begin with.  This 
argument would, therefore, permit lying to a small child about the Tooth Fairy to 
prevent its distress about losing a tooth. 
 
On the face of it, this seems to be a plausible view to hold.  Ordinarily, the FH 
commands us not to lie, but under the non-ideal or mitigating circumstances where 
others are either intending to use us as a mere means to their own ends, or where they 
are unable to make rational choices, a certain degree of deception is permissible.  
Circumstances such as these result in a “case of emergency” which “subverts the 
whole of morality” – in such non-ideal conditions “the moral rules are not certain” 
(LE, 27: 448, 204) and Kant seems to allow that we might be permitted to deviate 
from the rules that ordinarily bind us.  
 
However, there is an important concern about this view that is raised by both Schapiro 
(2006) and Korsgaard (1986).  This is that Kant regards deception as being “wrong in 
itself” because of its “manipulative character”, which means that “no change in 
external circumstances could make it right” (Schapiro, 2006: 37).  When I lie to 
someone else, I always violate the FH since I fail to allow her to choose her own ends, 
even if she “has adopted a blatantly immoral” one (Schapiro, 2006: 51).  As 
Korsgaard (1996: 347) points out, lies are always “wrong in themselves, regardless of 
whether they are told with good intentions or bad.” 
 
I think that we may accept the force of this objection and concede that there is always 
something wrong about lying without having to conclude that we have a rigorous duty 
to tell the truth, even under non-ideal conditions.  The key point to consider is that the 
case of the murderer is an exceptional one where we are faced with a real moral 
dilemma.  This means that there is something undesirable about any choice we could 
make in these circumstances.  We may tell the murderer the truth and risk the death of 
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our friend, thereby violating a prima facie duty not to allow others to be harmed when 
we could prevent their harm; or we lie to the murderer and disrespect his humanity.   
Assuming these are our only two options, neither of them seems attractive.  However, 
lying is nevertheless permissible in this case since we have no choice but to violate 
some prima facie duty in this rare situation.      
 
This point may be made more clearly using an analogy.  I consider a case where there 
is a shipwreck, and one person has managed to reach the safety of a lifeboat.  He sees 
two people floundering in the water – one of them is his wife, and the other is a doctor 
who has recently discovered the cure for cancer and is the only living person with this 
knowledge.  I suppose also that both these people are unable to swim and that the 
person in the lifeboat knows about the doctor‟s breakthrough – perhaps she made her 
discovery on board the ship and shared it with the passengers, without divulging any 
of the details as to what the cure was.  Furthermore, the man is unable to reach both 
his wife and the doctor in time, since they are both drowning and a sufficient distance 
apart – essentially, the situation is such that saving one will result in the inevitable 
death of the other. 
 
Clearly, the person in the lifeboat is in an unenviable position.  If he saves the doctor, 
he allows his wife to die, bringing grief to himself and his family and friends; if he 
saves his wife, he deprives thousands of cancer patients of a cure.  This is a true moral 
dilemma because neither option is attractive.  The person in the lifeboat has no choice 
but to violate some prima facie duty, because the circumstances force him to do so. 
 
I think that the presence of this moral dilemma means that we should not blame this 
person if he chose to save his wife over the doctor, or vice versa.  It is entirely 
impossible for him to avoid doing wrong to someone, and his circumstances are, 
indeed, most regrettable.  He must make a choice about whom to harm, and perhaps 
saving the doctor carries greater moral weight.  Since Kant thinks that we should 
choose the action that fulfils the greater number of imperfect duties, there may be a 
case for saying that he should save the doctor, since allowing her to die violates the 
imperfect duty to help more people (the doctor and all the cancer sufferers in the 
world) than saving his wife would.   
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However, I think it is at least plausible that we would not condemn him if he chooses 
to save his wife instead, although I will not argue that here.  The point is that saving 
the doctor, assuming it is the better alternative, still means violating a prima facie 
duty, and that no action that violates no such duty is possible for this person.  Thus, in 
this case, he may be excused for violating such a duty.  Of course, if he chooses to 
save nobody and simply rows to safety, then we have a good reason to hold him 
morally culpable, since he is in a position to fulfil some prima facie duty but fails to 
do so.  It is nevertheless plausible to claim that saving one of the two people absolves 
him from blame for allowing the other to drown. 
 
This example shows how non-ideal conditions permit one to perform an action that 
would be considered morally wrong under ideal circumstances.  It is easy to think of 
other, similar moral dilemmas where we have no option but to violate a prima facie 
duty to someone or something, such as where we can save the life of an endangered 
plant only by killing the endangered animal that is eating it, or perhaps having to harm 
an intruder to protect our families.  Everyday life sometimes throws up cases such as 
these, and under these circumstances morality requires that we do the best we can.  
Fortunately, though, these situations appear to be comparatively rare. 
 
Thus, the FH applies chiefly to ideal circumstances, and we may depart from the rule 
of respecting humanity if there is no alternative.  As Korsgaard (1986: 346) explains, 
the FH “provide[s] the ideal which governs our daily conduct” but “[w]hen dealing 
with evil circumstances we may depart from this ideal”, since the FH “is inapplicable” 
in these cases “because it is not designed for use when dealing with evil.”  Anyone 
who tries to apply the FH rigorously under all conditions misses this fundamental 
point – if circumstances make it impossible to choose a course of action that respects 
the humanity of all the parties involved, we are permitted to act contrary to the 
prescriptions of this principle. 
 
Another feature of the case of the murderer at the door is that the moral dilemma is 
actually brought about by the murderer‟s own actions and not by circumstances alone.  
It is the murderer who forces us to make a choice about which prima facie duty we 
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are going to violate.  This might provide us with an additional reason to lie to him, 
since the moral dilemma arises solely from his actions; because he has created the 
non-ideal conditions, we might be justified in disrespecting his autonomy by lying to 
him.   
 
Furthermore, as Singer (1954: 588) points out, telling the truth to the murderer might 
“be to treat the victim merely as a means to the end of the murderer, ends [s]he, as a 
victim, cannot... share” (my italics).  We might argue that divulging the victim‟s 
whereabouts to the murderer amounts to allowing her to become a tool for his evil 
intentions.  If this is the correct interpretation of the case, the moral dilemma is even 
more severe – both telling the truth and lying violate someone‟s autonomy, and there 
is no way of fulfilling the demands of the FH.  Once again, I feel that these 
exceptional circumstances permit us to lie to the murderer, especially because his 
actions bring about this dilemma in the first place. 
 
One might argue, however, that there are ways of dealing with the murderer that do 
not require treating him as a mere means.  For instance, we could tell him the truth but 
then stop him from killing the victim by pushing him down the stairs; we could 
remain silent even if he tortures us to try to extract the information; or we could 
answer his questions honestly, but then quickly lock the door to prevent his entering 
the house.   None of these actions involve violating the prima facie perfect duty of 
truthfulness, so it might be that they are all preferable than lying to the murderer. 
 
This argument fails because the case of the murderer at the door assumes that we have 
no alternative but to answer the murderer‟s question – if we had other options that did 
not involve violating any prima facie duties, then we would surely choose one of 
these.  As Singer (1954: 586) explains, the case must be framed in such a way “so that 
it cannot be said that one has the alternative of refusing to speak at all”.  The 
circumstances may be such that our only two options are to tell a lie or to expose an 
innocent person to danger.  However, even if we must answer the murderer‟s 
question, it might be argued that we are nevertheless able to answer truthfully without 
jeopardising the victim‟s safety. 
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Jonathan Adler (1997) provides an example of how this may be done.  He supposes 
that the murderer‟s intended victim “spends a good deal of time... at the local diner, 
the Nevada” (Adler, 1997: 437).   When the murderer asks where the victim is, we 
may reply, truthfully, that the victim has “been hanging around the Nevada a lot” 
(Adler, 1997: 438), thereby leading the murderer to believe that the victim might be at 
the Nevada at that time.  Adler explains that, since the murderer thinks that we are co-
operating with him and that our response is intended to be an answer to his question, 
he will be likely to act on the information we have given him and seek out his victim 
at the Nevada.  In this way, we may save our friend‟s life without violating our perfect 
duty not to lie – our response to the murderer‟s question is true, so we have not lied. 
 
On the face of it, this looks like it could be a plausible way of dealing with the 
dilemma of the murderer at the door.  We prevent the death of our friend, and, as 
Adler (1997: 438) explains, we do not lie to the murderer – instead, “he will take [us] 
as having conversationally implicated that [the victim] is at the Nevada now.”  Since 
the murderer draws his own conclusions from our true statement, it may be argued 
that we do not commit the “fundamental wrong” (Adler, 1997: 439) of lying to him.   
 
The murderer is free to ask further questions if he is not satisfied with our answer, and 
perhaps he could formulate a question that is so specific that we cannot escape either 
lying to him outright (by making a false statement) or giving away the whereabouts of 
the victim.  However, if this strategy succeeds in misleading the murderer, it seems as 
though there is “an admirable alternative to lying” that “is to be recommended” 
(Adler, 1997: 439) in dealing with non-ideal circumstances.  We can escape lying by 
“formulating such devious assertions” (Adler, 1997: 438) – all we have to do is think 
of an assertion that is true, but that is likely to mislead the person who hears it.  
 
Kant himself takes such a strategy into consideration.  He points out that “[o]ne could 
merely seem to give an answer” (MM, 6: 431, 554) to a question where a truthful 
response might harm someone – in Kant‟s example, if an author asks his audience 
whether they like his work, they might reply by “joking about the impropriety of such 
a question” (MM, 6: 431, 554) instead of admitting that they dislike it and offending 
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him.  From my answer to the murderer he “may deduce what I want him to” and, even 
if his conclusion is false, “I have told him no lie” (LE, 27: 446-7, 202).       
 
There are two important objections to this strategy, however.  The first is that it is 
perhaps not as likely to succeed as an outright lie.  As Adler (1997: 438) points out, 
there “is less certainty that the murderer will be misled” since the response is not a 
direct answer to his question.  When I say that the victim is often to be found at the 
Nevada diner, he might ask me “Are you sure she is there now?” requiring me to 
make yet another assertion.  This questioning process might conceivably last quite a 
long time, and the murderer could eventually come up with a question that is 
impossible to answer in this way – “no claim is made that there are always feasible 
constructions” to handle every possible question that we may be asked (Adler, 1997: 
438).   
 
As Kant points out, we might not be able to think of an answer that would both be 
true and satisfy the questioner: “who has his wit always ready?” (MM, 6: 431, 554).  
The “slightest hesitation in answering” (MM, 6: 431, 554) could cause the murderer 
to become suspicious and this would cause our strategy to fail.  Furthermore, the 
murderer might force me to answer only “yes” or “no” by threatening to kill me if I 
give any other answer.  The circumstances may be such that an outright lie is the only 
way of foiling the murderer‟s evil intentions, and if a true, but deceptive answer is 
unlikely to succeed, then this way of escaping the moral dilemma is not available to 
us.   
 
However, even if a misleading answer is an effective means of preventing the murder, 
there is another, more serious objection to this strategy.  This is that we will need to 
provide some account of why the misleading answer is a morally preferable way of 
dealing with the murderer than lying to him, and it is far from obvious that this is so.  
The only relevant difference between the lie and the deceptive truth is that the latter 
statement is true, while the former is false.  It may, however, be argued that the 
intention behind each of the statements is the same – that is, to deceive the murderer – 
and that it is this intention of deceiving someone that is morally abhorrent, on the FH, 
since any act of deception prevents him from freely choosing his own ends and, 
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therefore, disrespects his humanity.  If this is so, then the misleading truth is no better 
than the lie. 
 
This line of argument may be developed by using an example from Siegler (1966), 
which again shows that telling a lie does not necessarily require the statement that is 
made to be false.  He considers Jean-Paul Sartre‟s story The Wall, in which a 
character called Pablo is asked by the authorities where his friend, Ramon Gris, is 
hiding.  Pablo does not wish Gris to be found, so he answers that his friend is in the 
cemetery, while being “quite certain that [he is] hiding somewhere else” (Siegler, 
1966: 130).  This is clearly “an attempt to deceive the authorities” since Pablo tells 
them “what he believe[s] to be false” in the hope that they will act on it and fail to 
find Gris (Siegler, 1966: 130).  Thus it appears as though Pablo lies to the authorities 
in this story. 
 
However, Ramon Gris is really hiding in the cemetery, quite “by chance, and 
completely unknown to Pablo” (Siegler, 1966: 130).  This means that the statement 
that Pablo makes is true, even though he intends it to deceive the authorities.  If the 
falsity of the statement made is a necessary condition for telling a lie (contrary to 
what I have argued earlier), it seems as though Pablo does not lie to the authorities 
after all, since he tells them the truth.  Yet, as Siegler (1966: 130-1) points out, “[i]f 
Pablo were asked immediately afterward whether he had told a lie, and he were to 
answer honestly, he would say that he had”.  Furthermore, if people regularly made 
statements to others that they believed to be false, “[s]uch behavio[u]r would be 
excellent grounds for mistrusting [their] honesty” since “it is just that sort of thing that 
liars do” (Siegler, 1966: 130), even if some of those statements turned out to be true 
afterwards.   
 
In this example, therefore, we might plausibly say that someone can tell a lie even if 
the statement that he makes is true.  Kant (RL, 427, 65) considers a similar case, 
where we tell the murderer that our friend is not at home while she “has gone out... 
with the result that” the murderer encounters her and kills her.  Even though this 
statement is true, Kant (RL, 427, 65) thinks that we have “told a lie” by saying that 
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she was “not in the house” and that we may be “justly accused as having caused [her] 
death”.   
 
This statement may reasonably be regarded as a lie as it contains the intention to 
deceive, which is “necessarily involved in lying” (Siegler, 1966: 130).  For Kant, it is 
our intent to deceive others and thereby prevent them from attaining their own ends 
that is impermissible, and even a true statement may be made with the intent to 
deceive, as the preceding examples show.  Deceptive statements “endeavo[u]r to 
contribute causally toward [another person‟s] believing” a particular proposition, 
according to Roderick Chisholm and Thomas Feehan (1977: 146), and, when we 
make an utterance that causes someone to acquire a belief that we believe to false, we 
deliberately interfere with his capacity to make free choices, since we try to impose a 
false belief on him.  Heimo Hofmeister (1972: 264) makes this point clearly: 
“falsifications of facts are not immoral by themselves, but only by being 
apprehended... in a certain way” – thus it is not the falsehood of the proposition that 
makes it morally wrong, but the effect it has (or is intended to have) on the autonomy 
of the victim of the lie.  
 
From this analysis it is reasonable to claim that a misleading truth is not an acceptable 
alternative to an outright lie after all, since it also involves deception.  Thus the 
strategy of telling a deceptive truth is not morally preferable to that of lying outright – 
they both violate the prescription of the FH never to treat others as a mere means, and 
there does not seem to be a relevant moral difference between them.  In genuine moral 
dilemmas, however, we may be permitted to deceive others (by lying or otherwise) 
simply because the conditions are non-ideal; here, we have no option but to violate 
some or other prima facie duty.  This means that, although the FH prescribes absolute 
honesty under ideal conditions, it does not forbid lying under non-ideal 
circumstances.  I will now turn to the third and final formulation of the categorical 
imperative and show that it allows us to derive similar conclusions. 
 
V.  The FKE and Lying 
Most commentators focus on one of the first two formulations of the categorical 
imperative when they criticise or defend Kant‟s views on lying (Wood, 2008).  
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However, as I have explained previously, it is also possible to argue that lying is 
impermissible based on the FKE.  Legislators making laws for a kingdom where 
everyone shares ends and where everyone is a co-legislator would outlaw lying, 
because lies make shared ends – the foundation on which the kingdom of ends is 
based – impossible.   
 
In this section I will argue that the FKE does not lead to an absolute prohibition on 
lying, for two main reasons.  First, as I will show, there are some cases in which the 
universal co-legislators would make laws permitting (or even requiring) the members 
of the kingdom of ends to lie.  Second, I will claim (with Schapiro, 2003; 2006) that 
the murderer‟s evil intentions disqualify him from membership of the kingdom of 
ends, which means that we are entitled to act differently towards him than towards 
other people.  I will consider Schapiro‟s argument in detail and try to defend it against 
an important objection.  From these two lines of argument I will conclude that we 
may, indeed, lie to the murderer at the door, even in the kingdom of ends.  
 
As noted in the previous section, Herman (1993) suggests taking a Rawlsian approach 
to the categorical imperative by employing his veil of ignorance in moral judgements.  
This means that the universal co-legislators should consider the position of the worst-
off person in the kingdom of ends when deciding what laws to pass – in other words, 
they should “direct[-] [their] attention to the worst that can happen under any 
proposed course of action” (Rawls, 1971: 154) and make laws that secure the best 
possible outcome for that person.     
 
It seems as though the Rawlsian “original position” is quite similar to the conception 
of the kingdom of ends.  Rawls (1971: 141) claims that the “right course of action”, or 
the right laws to pass, are those that “best advance[-] social aims as these would be 
formulated by reflective agreement given that the parties... are moved by a benevolent 
concern for one another‟s interests”.  This description of social aims and mutual 
benevolence seems to match what Kant has in mind with his kingdom of ends, where 
rational co-legislators must make laws for the good of the society as a whole.  It is 
therefore a reasonable strategy to consider the laws that the Kantian legislators would 
make in terms of the original position. 
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As discussed in the preceding section, it seems as though the co-legislators would not 
pass a law that requires strict truthfulness at all times.  The mere possibility of a 
situation where a lie could save a life or prevent harm would be sufficient to permit it, 
on Rawlsian grounds, because the intended victim of the murder clearly stands to lose 
far more than the victim of the lie.  It is surely reasonable to suggest that the co-
legislators would agree, after reflection, that lying should be allowed in the kingdom 
of ends in such extreme cases, since they would wish the lie to be told if they were in 
the position of the murder victim.  Certainly, killing someone has a far more 
detrimental effect on her ability to choose her own ends than lying to her, since it 
constitutes a permanent frustration of all her current and possible future ends, while 
the lie only frustrates one end.  Faced with this choice, one might think that the co-
legislators would prefer a law that allows the lie to one that requires a rigorous 
adherence to the truth.   
 
It is possible to think of some other cases of lying that might rationally be permitted 
by the universal co-legislators.  Kant (AP, 180, 73) points to the “harmless lying that 
is always met with in children and now and then in adults”; that is, the tendency to 
embellish one‟s stories with exaggerations or invented facts in order to make them 
more interesting, and, as I will argue, this type of lie would not necessarily be 
forbidden on the FKE. 
 
It is easy to think of an example of Kant‟s “harmless lying”.  Suppose someone who, 
disturbed by some felines caterwauling outside her bedroom at night, makes the 
following statement (S) to her colleagues the next morning:  “Last night there were 
dozens of cats outside my window; they made the worst racket you can think of, all 
night long, and I didn‟t get a wink of sleep.”   
 
Clearly, S is a lie, as it contains at least four blatant untruths.  First, there were surely 
not dozens of cats outside – at most there would have been two or three (and not at 
least twenty-four, as the word “dozens” implies).  Second, the sound of a few cats 
fighting is certainly not the worst racket that the speaker‟s colleagues can think of.  
Most people would be able to think of sounds that are far more displeasing to the ear.  
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Third, the noise certainly did not last all night long – even the most energetic cats are 
unlikely to meow incessantly for an entire night without respite.  And fourth, it is 
improbable that the speaker had no sleep whatsoever – perhaps she was able to sleep 
for one or two hours when the noise died down.  Yet, even though S is a lie, it 
nevertheless appears to be “harmless”, and it is difficult to see how the co-legislators 
would forbid it, as I will explain. 
 
The law in the kingdom of ends is supposed to be universally binding on all its 
members at all times.  As Campbell Garnett (1964: 299) points out, a moral rule is a 
“rule of general applicability that is required for the welfare of the interacting group 
as a whole.”  If the co-legislators make a generally applicable law that outlaws 
statements such as S, they would have to say that exaggerations are always morally 
wrong.  This is unsatisfactory, for at least two reasons. 
 
The first reason is that nobody is deceived by a statement such as S – it is, indeed, 
harmless.  When the speaker says S, we commonly draw the (true) conclusion that 
there were some cats that made a noise and disturbed her sleep, even though none of 
the facts she asserts in S are strictly true.  She also does not have an intention to 
deceive us – instead, she is simply trying to make her story more interesting to the 
hearer.  Nobody‟s ends depend on S, so she is not frustrating anyone‟s goals.  
However, if the law in the kingdom of ends is formulated so that it forbids all forms 
of lying, we have to say that the speaker has done something morally wrong; that she 
has harmed humanity or prevented social co-operation; and that she deserves censure 
and reproach for her actions.  It looks as though a law that leads to these conclusions 
is unreasonably strict. 
 
The second reason is that the universal co-legislators could rationally choose laws that 
permit statements such as S to be made instead of laws that permit only entirely true 
statements such as “I didn‟t sleep well last night because of some noisy cats” (S‟).  If 
we apply the veil of ignorance to this situation, we may argue that the scenario where 
the speaker says S‟ causes the person who is worst off to hear a story that is 
significantly less interesting and enjoyable than what he would hear if the speaker 
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says S.  Thus, laws permitting S are, ceteris paribus, preferable to those do not, since 
S causes the greater degree of pleasure.   
 
Furthermore, in the kingdom where exaggeration is forbidden, people would have to 
take the utmost care in formulating statements.  The prohibition on lying would make 
them count their words carefully to avoid any inaccuracies, since these would be 
morally impermissible.  This is not the case when statements such as S are allowed, 
and narrators of stories are allowed some poetic licence (which increases the 
satisfaction of those who listen to the stories).  Perhaps the co-legislators would, 
therefore, choose laws that permit lies that make stories more entertaining. 
 
This argument may be extended to other types of lies, such as those that are told to 
enable surprise parties or to placate children – these lies seem to be at least 
permissible, if not desirable.  Players of card games such as poker often engage in 
deception within the game, and it may be argued that permitting deception during 
certain games greatly enhances the enjoyment of the players.  Similarly, one might 
contend, with Alan Strudler (1995) that deception is an essential part of negotiation 
and that, under certain circumstances, it is an important “device that... people... can 
use to work their way to a reasonable and mutually advantageous agreement” in 
commerce.      
 
Even if one does not find all these arguments convincing, it seems reasonable to say 
that there are some situations in which lying would usually render the worst-off 
person better off than absolute truthfulness.  The example of the murderer at the door 
is a case in point.  This means that a kingdom where certain harmless lies and lies told 
to prevent harm are permitted could be said to be superior to one where lies are 
absolutely forbidden.  A blanket ban on lying therefore seems to be undesirable in the 
kingdom of ends, as the lawmakers need to take these extreme cases in account before 
reaching reflective agreement.  Thus, it is plausible to claim that the co-legislators in 
the kingdom of ends would perhaps allow certain kinds of lies in their realm, and 
these types of lies are, therefore, consistent with the FKE. 
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There is one important objection to this analysis, however.  One might argue, rightly, 
that the Rawlsian method of maximising the position of the worst-off person is a 
consequentialist one, since it looks only at the likely effects of the lies.  This is 
inconsistent with the Kantian view that lies are impermissible independent of their 
consequences – there is something inherently wrong about lying, and the results of an 
act of lying are irrelevant to their wrongness.  Thus we might contend that the 
universal co-legislators would forbid lying because it is always wrong in itself, despite 
the existence of certain cases where lying has better consequences than truthfulness. 
 
However, there is a second line of reasoning that escapes this objection.  Even if the 
universal legislators would not choose laws that permit these lies, it may still be 
argued that the FKE does not forbid us from lying to people who have evil purposes.  
This is because such people show, by their actions, that they are unwilling to be 
members of the kingdom of ends.  We might claim that the moral rules bind only 
those people who are part of the realm, and that they do not apply when we deal with 
those who have chosen to leave it of their own volition, such as the murderer at the 
door.  This is the argument developed by Schapiro (2003; 2006). 
 
To understand Schapiro‟s view, we have to refer to Rawls‟ (1955: 23-4) emphasis on 
the distinction between “rules defining a practice” and “general” or “summary” rules, 
which Schapiro (2003: 334) calls “rules of thumb”.  Summary rules are “generali[s]ed 
reports of the results of applying some or other rule directly to the cases at hand” 
(Schapiro, 2003: 334).  This means that, when we apply a summary rule, we do not 
consider the features of the individual case – instead, we simply use a rule of thumb 
that “by and large... will give the correct decision” (Rawls, 1955: 23) in moral 
deliberations.   
 
This point may be clarified by means of an example.  Usually, the rule to be truthful 
“may be relied upon to express the correct” moral judgement (Rawls, 1955: 23) since 
there are many cases in which honesty seems to be, intuitively, the right thing to do.  
The extreme cases in which it looks as though we might be better off telling a lie are 
comparatively rare.  Therefore, as Rawls (1955: 23) points out, we “would be justified 
in urging [the] adoption” of being honest at all times “as a general rule”.  If we follow 
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this rule of thumb, we are likely to make many more correct moral decisions than 
wrong ones, so we are entitled to adopt it as a rule of conduct, even though it may be 
“laid aside in extraordinary cases where there is no assurance that the generali[s]ation 
will hold and the case must... be treated on its merits” (Rawls, 1955: 24). 
 
Practice rules, on the other hand, “define procedures compliance with which 
constitutes participation in some new activity” (Schapiro, 2003: 334).   In other 
words, practice rules are set up to govern a particular institution or activity and, if 
someone wishes to participate in that activity, he or she must follow the rules.  Rawls 
(1955: 25) explains the point clearly by using a sporting analogy – the game of 
baseball is governed by certain rules that describe our actions, and we may perform 
actions, within baseball, such as “[s]triking out, stealing a base” and so on.   
 
These actions are specific to the game of baseball because, even though one may 
perform actions such as swinging a baseball bat outside a game, one cannot “be 
described as... striking out... unless [one] could also be described as playing baseball” 
(Rawls, 1955: 25).  Thus only the practice rules properly describe our behaviour 
within the boundaries of that practice (Schapiro, 2006).  Moreover, the rules of 
baseball define what one is legally allowed to do in a game – non-compliance with 
these rules (for example, throwing the bat instead of the ball) means that we are not 
playing baseball.  As Rawls (1955: 26) explains, “[i]f one wants to do an action which 
a certain practice specifies then there is no way to do it except to follow the rules 
which define it.”  On Schapiro‟s (2003: 336) view, “the notion of a practice rule can 
be invoked... to build the right kind of flexibility into a two-level Kantian theory”, 
making it permissible to lie to the murderer at the door. 
 
This can be done by regarding the kingdom of ends as a practice, or an institution, that 
has been established for the good of its members.  The universal co-legislators all 
agree on what the rules of the kingdom are, and these rules govern and describe the 
actions of all those participating in the kingdom.  On Rawls‟ analysis, one needs to 
comply with the rules of the kingdom in order to participate in the practice that they 
govern.  It may be argued that the murderer at the door has, by his actions, revealed 
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himself as unwilling to participate in the practice and that this may entitle us to lie to 
him. 
 
Schapiro (2003: 339) argues that, when someone fails to comply with the practice 
rules, the practice of respecting humanity becomes a “sham”.  This occurs when “the 
non-compliant party... tacitly or implicitly claim[s] the protections and prerogatives 
attached to his role” within the practice “while at the same time failing to live up to its 
demands” which renders any attempt by others to follow the practice rules futile and 
meaningless.  It seems as though the murderer may be regarded as such a non-
compliant party, and that his actions cause the practice of respecting humanity to 
become a sham, as I shall explain. 
 
When the murderer enquires about our friend‟s whereabouts, he is indeed “implicitly 
claiming the prerogatives attached to his role” within the kingdom of ends.  He seeks 
the truth from us and expects us to be honest, and he is entitled, as a participant in the 
kingdom, to receive truthful answers to his questions as honesty is a practice rule 
governing expected and appropriate behaviour within the kingdom of ends.  However, 
he “fails to live up to the demands” of the practice because he intends to use the 
information to break one of the rules of the kingdom (that is, not to kill any of its 
members).   
 
Thus he expects me to be governed by the very same practice rules that he intends to 
break.  He wishes to disrespect the humanity of his victim, while expecting me to 
respect his humanity.  When I tell the truth to him, this act of honesty “is no longer 
what it ought to be” (Schapiro, 2003: 339) because the murderer is no longer a 
participant in the practice, and he has turned the practice of respecting humanity into a 
sham.  In essence, the murderer “abandon[s] [his] role” as a member of the kingdom 
and the ordinary rules governing the practice therefore do not apply to our dealings 
with him (Schapiro, 2003: 340). 
 
The analogy with baseball may serve to clarify this point.  If I am a pitcher in a 
baseball game, I am ordinarily expected to throw pitches at the batter.  However, if a 
streaker who wishes to disrupt the match runs over and stands on the batter‟s plate, it 
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is futile for me to throw a pitch at her and expect her to hit it, since she is simply not 
playing the game.  This would certainly be a strange way of dealing with a streaker – 
she is not a participant in the game and should not be treated as such.    
 
Of course, the streaker was not a participant in the game to begin with, and might 
therefore not be subject to any of its rules, but we may modify the example by 
supposing that a batter from the opposing team chooses to campaign for some or other 
cause by stripping off all his clothes on the batter‟s plate.  Once again, throwing a 
pitch at him seems to be futile, since he indicates that he does not wish to play 
baseball.  As Schapiro (2003: 340) explains, “because you are a participant [in the 
practice] you have to play... and the only way to play is to play by the rules”. 
 
It seems reasonable to assert that we are justified in breaking the rules of a practice in 
order to deal with someone who has already done so or who intends to do so.  Even 
though the rules of football ordinarily forbid picking up the ball and throwing it at the 
referee, we may be justified in doing so if he abandons his role as referee and instead 
runs towards a fan to attack her.  We will not be committing a football foul if we stop 
the attack in this way, since, at that time, we are simply not playing football.  
Furthermore, we are breaking a rule of football only because the referee‟s actions 
have caused the game to stop – he has turned the football match into a sham and it is 
futile to continue playing under these circumstances. 
 
This seems to be a promising line of argument as it accounts for the view that we may 
lie to the murderer because he is not entitled to the truth.  As Schapiro (2003: 343) 
explains, “[w]hat is essential to the practice is that it is a system of social 
cooperation”.  Clearly, the murderer is not willing to promote the ends of social 
cooperation – his choice of an evil end “makes it appropriate for [us] to regard him as 
having refused to participate in the shared activity of which honesty is a part” 
(Schapiro, 2006: 52).  In this case, “it is impossible... to be honest... in the spirit 
proper to honesty” (Schapiro, 2006: 52) as the murderer‟s ends conflict with the 
reciprocity presupposed by the kingdom of ends.  On these grounds, we are justified 
in lying to him. 
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Schapiro‟s argument has the further advantage in that we can extend the analysis to 
cases involving what she calls “paternalistic deception” (Schapiro, 2006: 52); that is, 
lying to people who are incapable of making rational choices.  We might think that it 
is permissible to lie to someone who has a psychological disorder, or is clinically 
insane, if this would prevent her from making a very bad choice.  People who are not 
fully rational are simply unable to participate in the institution of a kingdom of ends, 
“due to conditions of disease or immaturity” (Schapiro, 2006: 52) and we are not 
bound by the usual practice rules governing the kingdom in our dealings with such 
individuals.  As Schapiro (2006: 52) explains, we may be justified in breaking the 
rules when dealing with people who “either „can‟t‟ or „won‟t‟” participate in the 
kingdom of ends.  In these cases, lies are not inconsistent with the FKE, since the 
rules made by the universal lawmakers apply only to those who are willing 
participants in the kingdom and not to those who “refuse[-] to play the colegislation 
game” (Schapiro, 2006: 52).   
 
This is an attractive conclusion since it accounts for “both the rigidity and the 
flexibility of moral rules” (Schapiro, 2006: 32) – it explains why universal co-
legislators would permit exceptions to their otherwise binding prohibition on lying, 
since the rules are rigid only for those who adhere to the practice in question.  
Moreover, this account cannot be accused of being a consequentialist one.  The 
lawmakers choose the rules because they consider the actions they forbid to be wrong 
intrinsically, not because of their possible consequences, and the explanation of when 
and why we may depart from the rules is coherent and reasonable.  However, this 
argument is vulnerable to a seemingly telling objection, that is, that it proves too 
much, as I shall now explain. 
 
The conclusion of Schapiro‟s analysis is that we are permitted to break the otherwise 
binding moral rules when dealing with someone who is no longer a participant in the 
kingdom of ends.  This explains why lying to him is not inconsistent with the FKE.  
However, this seems to entail that we would be justified in taking any action against 
the murderer (even killing, maiming or torturing him) if this would prevent the crime, 
since his voluntary non-participation in the kingdom of ends renders us free to treat 
him in any way we like.  This objection poses a significant challenge to Schapiro‟s 
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argument – if we can condone lying to the murderer, why can we not use the same 
considerations to justify torturing or killing him?  If we accept Schapiro‟s 
conclusions, then we appear to be on a slippery slope indeed, as ordinary morality 
does not seem to apply to the murderer at the door. 
 
I think that Schapiro could adequately respond to this objection by appealing to the 
degree to which we are allowed to break the rules in order to deal with the murderer.  
It is true that telling a lie is immoral, but the effect of lying is far less harmful to the 
murderer than killing or torturing him would be, even if these methods would serve 
the same purpose of preventing the crime.  We might be able to argue that, since the 
moral rules have intrinsic value, and that violating them is always regrettable, we 
should choose the course of action that least harms the person whose actions and 
intentions leave us with no choice but to violate the rules, even if he has chosen not to 
participate in the kingdom of ends. 
 
If we are faced with the choice of either lying to the murderer or killing him to try to 
save the victim‟s life, then, it seems as though we have some good reasons for opting 
to lie.  I will argue that, while the lie is a permissible way of dealing with the 
situation, murdering him is excessive and unwarranted in this situation.  This is 
because, while a threatening situation “allows [us] to use a variety of means” in our 
defence (Strudler, 1995: 811), we should nonetheless choose the method that causes 
minimal harm to our assailant.  I will defend this position by considering the two 
possible ways of protecting our friend against the murderer – lying to him or killing 
him - in turn, assuming that both of them are guaranteed to succeed and that, 
therefore, we have no reason to choose one over the other on the basis of its efficacy. 
 
If we lie to the murderer, it is clear that we disrespect his autonomy and freedom of 
choice, on Kant‟s view.  This is a deviation from the ideal moral laws made by the 
universal co-legislators in the kingdom of ends, and we should therefore not tell a lie 
under ordinary circumstances.  However, since the murderer intends to use our honest 
answer to violate the credo of mutual respect prescribed by the FKE, we are 
apparently justified in using the lie in self-defence.  Here, no force is involved and the 
effect on the murderer‟s ends is minimal – all we do is frustrate one of his purposes.  
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We do not prevent him from attaining any of his other goals, such as earning a living 
(assuming he is not a hit-man who will be paid if he kills our friend), developing his 
talents, taking care of his family or keeping his promises.  All we do is thwart his plan 
to kill his victim. 
 
Murdering him, on the other hand, clearly constitutes a far greater interference with 
his ability to set his own goals.  Since we end his life, we prevent him from attaining 
all of his aims.  We contribute towards his inability to fulfil any of his other prima 
facie duties, and it seems reasonable to assume that he intends to fulfil some of these 
– perhaps he wishes to take care of his family or develop his talents.  It may, 
therefore, be argued that the murderer intends to break only one of the practice rules 
defining the kingdom of ends – that is, the only rule he intends to break is the decree 
not to kill.  We may, therefore, break the rules in order to prevent him from achieving 
this aim; but it seems unreasonable to say that we should act so that he is no longer 
able to achieve any of his goals. 
 
 
Strudler (1995: 811) makes a similar point when he notes that “[i]t is excessive to kill 
somebody to prevent him from stealing carrots from your garden”.  It hardly seems 
warranted to use deadly force in such a situation if there are other means to stop the 
theft.  Kant‟s moral theory assigns a great deal of importance to autonomy and it 
seems reasonable to think that, since autonomy is so valuable, we should try to 
minimise our interference with the goals of others.  It is always regrettable when 
someone‟s autonomy is violated, even if they have chosen to stop participating in the 
kingdom of ends, and we should, therefore, find ways of dealing with them that 
respects their autonomy to the greatest degree possible.  Since the lie prevents only 
one free choice, while the murder prevents all future choices, the lie is clearly 
preferable.  This seems to be a plausible way of responding to the objection that 
Schapiro‟s analysis proves too much – even though we are free to choose from a 
number of methods of defending ourselves against evil-doers, we should nevertheless 
try to respect their autonomy insofar as this is possible. 
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However, it is possible to conceive of a situation where killing the murderer and 
interfering permanently with his autonomy would, after all, be justified.  Suppose that, 
instead of finding the murderer on our doorstep, we come home and encounter him 
about to kill his victim.  Perhaps he has a knife at her throat and it is clear that he 
intends to use it.  If we have a gun and can protect an innocent life by shooting the 
murderer, it seems as though we may be justified in doing so.  It seems reasonable to 
think that we may use even deadly force or perform certain otherwise impermissible 
acts in cases such as this one, or in self-defence, when this is the only way to save a 
victim‟s life. 
 
This case differs from Kant‟s case in the important respect that killing the murderer 
appears to be the only way in which to save the victim‟s life.  Clearly, a lie would be 
of little use in this situation – I cannot protect my friend by telling the murderer a 
blatant untruth, such as “Paris is the capital of Germany”.  Of course, in certain 
circumstances a lie might prevent the murder; for example, if I tell the murderer that I 
just won a million rand in the lottery and will give it to him if he drops the knife and 
lets my friend go, he might reconsider.  However, if shooting the murderer is truly the 
only way to prevent the death of his intended victim, it seems as though we may be 
entitled to do it (although one might argue that we should try to injure him instead of 
killing him if this is at all possible). 
 
We might, therefore, have a response to the objection that Schapiro‟s solution leads to 
a slippery slope if we claim that different types of non-ideal conditions require 
varying degrees of interference with the autonomy of those who have chosen to break 
the rules of the kingdom of ends.  Any way of dealing with these circumstances will 
involve violating someone else‟s autonomy to a certain extent, but we should, where 
possible, minimise this violation.  If the lie is all that is required to prevent a murder, 
we choose it over shooting the perpetrator because it is a one-time interference with 
his autonomy over a permanent one.  Similarly, if we can stop the murderer by 
shooting at his arm instead of at his head, we should choose the arm, since that action 
interferes only with the choices he could make regarding the use of a limb instead of 
all of his future choices.  Of course, any interference with someone else‟s freedom of 
choice is deplorable, but in non-ideal circumstances we have no option but to do so.     
59 
 
 
This response gives us a way of working out precisely what we are entitled to do to a 
wrong-doer who breaks the rules of the kingdom of ends – perhaps there is some 
rank-order of levels of interference with other people‟s autonomy.  Every possible 
response could be evaluated in terms of the degree to which it disrespects someone 
else.  Killing someone ranks near the top of the list, since death renders all our ends 
impossible, whereas lying is probably somewhere near the bottom; and a once-off lie, 
which interferes with someone‟s autonomy only on a particular occasion, ranks lower 
than an elaborate ruse or charade designed to deceive a person over time (such as 
someone lying to her spouse about her infidelity for an extended period).  There might 
be certain acts at the top of the list that disrespect autonomy to such an extent that 
they may never be done, under any circumstances, since there is always a preferable 
alternative – biological or nuclear warfare on an entire nation possibly meets this 
condition.  On the other hand, some actions near the bottom of the list may be 
minimal violations of autonomy, such as standing in a doorway for a short period of 
time to prevent someone from entering it freely.   
 
This could mean that interference with autonomy is a matter of degree, and different 
situations warrant different levels of intrusion.  I feel that this is a plausible view to 
hold and we could perhaps appeal to such a rank-order in deciding what we are 
entitled to do in non-ideal conditions – some actions may be justified in certain 
circumstances, but not in others, and the rank-order may be helpful in determining 
what is permissible.   
 
Thomas Nagel (1972: 141) provides some support for this view in claiming that there 
are some actions that can never be justified, even in warfare, such as “weapons 
designed to maim or torture or disfigure the opponent rather than merely to stop him”.  
Nagel argues that, in warfare, we are entitled to perform actions that stop combatants 
in their capacity as soldiers, but not as human beings.  If we use weapons that cause 
more harm than necessary to prevent a soldier from carrying out acts of war, we 
“attack the men, not the soldiers” (Nagel, 1972: 141) and this is not justifiable since it 
is extreme.  We might extend this conclusion to the case of the murderer at the door as 
follows: if we lie to him, we stop him as a murderer because his plan is thwarted.  He 
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can, however, still engage in a variety of free choices that are consistent with his 
rational nature as a human being and our lie does not attack him as a person. 
 
Of course, it may be argued that killing the murderer does stop him as a human being 
since, as I have explained, all his future choices are rendered impossible.  However, if 
this is the only way to prevent the murder of the victim, we may – even on Nagel‟s 
analysis - nevertheless be entitled to do so.  Nagel (1972: 138) makes the key point 
that one may use deadly force against someone else but still treat her with respect: “to 
fire a machine gun at someone who is throwing hand grenades at your emplacement is 
to treat him as a human being”.  This is because the “attack is aimed specifically 
against the threat presented by a dangerous adversary” (Nagel, 1972: 138).  Firing the 
machine gun is the appropriate response to someone who chooses to throw hand 
grenades simply because he could foresee that someone would respond to him in that 
way and because such a response is justified in meeting that threat.  A soldier expects 
that his opponents will try to deal with his actions by force – in doing so, they are not 
disrespecting him as a human being, but reacting appropriately to him as a soldier. 
 
In the same way, lying to the murderer at the door is a way of meeting his threat, as is 
shooting him when he holds a knife to his victim‟s throat.  It may be argued that there 
is no disrespect to him as a person, but that we are merely dealing with him in the way 
we ordinarily deal with murderers – that is, to employ the means necessary to save the 
lives of their victims or to punish them for their wrongdoing.  Just as a human being 
acquires special status as a soldier when she joins the army, so a human being 
acquires special status when he chooses to become a murderer.  On Nagel‟s view, 
then, it seems as though we would not disrespect the murderer by dealing 
appropriately with him; we are justified in lying to him or killing him “on the basis of 
[his] immediate threat or harmfulness” (Nagel, 1972: 140).   This view is not 
uncontroversial and it certainly needs more development, but at the very least it 
provides some support for the position that there are levels of interference with the 
autonomy of others.  
 
A further consequence of this response is that we may be required to tell the murderer 
the truth if he asks us any other questions that are not relevant to his evil purposes, 
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since failure to do so would disrespect him as a human being because he is not asking 
those questions qua murderer.  Suppose that he is satisfied when we tell him that our 
friend is not home, and then asks us where the nearest Italian restaurant is as he is 
hungry.  Are we permitted to lie to him about its location?  I contend that, if he seeks 
nothing further by asking this question than to find a place to eat dinner, we are bound 
to answer honestly.  We have successfully thwarted his ends and this question is 
innocent – he may be said to be participating in the kingdom of ends once again. 
 
We may return to the baseball analogy to support this conclusion.  Suppose that the 
protesting batter has stripped naked on the batter‟s plate and made his point, gaining 
the attention needed to demonstrate for his cause.  He now gets dressed, fetches his 
bat and is ready to play again.  Should I pitch the ball to him?  It seems as though the 
game can now restart, and his momentary departure from the rules governing the 
practice is over.  Since we are once again playing baseball, it seems as though I 
should throw my pitch.  In the same way, I should answer the murderer honestly, 
since he has abandoned his evil plan. 
 
To summarise, then, the conclusion of this analysis is as follows: Members of the 
kingdom of ends are usually bound by its rules, although exceptions may be made 
when dealing with those who have voluntarily refused to participate in the kingdom.  
However, this does not mean that we may treat the non-participants in any way we 
like.  We are entitled to break the rules in our dealings with them, but only insofar as 
their actions render the kingdom a sham.  Furthermore, when faced with alternative 
ways of responding to their actions, we should try to minimise our interference with 
their autonomy.  Therefore, even though the FKE usually prohibits lying, there are 
certain situations in which it is permissible.   
 
In the preceding discussion I have tried to show that all three of the formulations of 
the categorical imperative permit lying under some circumstances.  Some maxims 
requiring lies are universalisable according to the FUL; the FH allows lies in non-
ideal conditions; and lying to non-participants in the kingdom of ends may be justified 
on the FKE.  Kant‟s moral principle therefore does not seem at odds with our 
intuitions that lying is sometimes not morally wrong.  So far, however, I have 
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assumed that the proper way to understand the categorical imperative is to see it as a 
moral decision-making rule that guides our actions – however, there is an alternative 
interpretation that regards it as a principle grounding an objective moral law that 
underlies all right actions.  I will discuss this interpretation in the next section and 
consider whether or not it leads to the same conclusions. 
 
 
VI.  The Categorical Imperative as an Objective Moral Law 
In this section, I consider the categorical imperative not as a normative rule for 
judging whether a particular action is morally permissible, but as the grounding of an 
objective moral law.  On this view, the categorical imperative is not a method of 
deciding whether or not we may perform a given action, but rather as an explanation 
of why the action is morally permissible or not.  As Philip Stratton-Lake (2000: 68) 
explains, the categorical imperative “may be understood as grounding particular 
obligations not in the sense that it justifies them, but in the sense that it acts as the 
condition of their possibility.”   
 
Jens Timmermann (2007: 112) points out that people generally “know full well what 
they ought to do if only they pay due attention to their own moral judgement”; they do 
not need to have read Kant‟s works in order to tell right from wrong.  We therefore do 
not need to use the categorical imperative as a decision-making rule in practice.  
Instead, it grounds an objective standard that may be used to justify our moral 
judgements – we say actions are wrong because they do not correspond to any of the 
three formulations of the imperative.  What all morally impermissible actions have in 
common is that they fail to meet the objective standard of the categorical imperative. 
 
The difference between these two interpretations of Kant‟s moral principle can be 
seen clearly if we consider the murderer-at-the-door scenario.  If the categorical 
imperative is a decision-making rule, we consider our action in terms of any (or all) of 
the three formulations of the principle.  We conclude that the action is morally wrong 
if the maxim on which it depends cannot be universalised (violating the FUL); if it 
treats others as ends in themselves (violating the FH); or if it is incompatible with the 
laws that would be made by co-legislators in a kingdom of ends.  On the other hand, if 
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the action passes these three tests, we may deduce that the action is permissible.  
Clearly, this procedure treats the categorical imperative as a test for whether an action 
is right or wrong. 
 
If the categorical imperative is an underlying principle that makes right action 
possible, however, and if it grounds an objective moral law, then the analysis is quite 
different.  To understand this view, we must first note that Kant thinks that moral laws 
(and specifically the categorical imperative) are known a priori, that is, independently 
of all experience.  He points out that moral laws “hold as laws only insofar as they can 
be seen to have an a priori basis” (MM, 6: 215, 370) and that “reason commands how 
we are to act, even though no example of this could be found” (MM, 6: 216, 371).  
This means that all moral principles and duties “could be spelled out entirely 
independently of any empirical knowledge” (Wood, 2002: 2).  From reason alone, we 
are able to derive moral judgements such as “It is wrong to lie”, without drawing on 
any empirical facts. 
 
Another key element of this interpretation is that it considers moral principles to be 
hierarchical.  As Hanna (2009) explains, we need to distinguish three levels of 
principles.  The highest level contains “absolute moral meta-principles, which are 
strictly and unconditionally universal a priori normative rules binding on all rational 
beings” (Hanna, 2009: 6) and the categorical imperative falls into this category.  
These meta-principles underlie all our moral principles and we are, therefore, required 
to obey the categorical imperative at all times, since it is the “law of morality” and an 
“absolute command” (G, 420, 29). 
 
The second level in the hierarchy contains elements that Hanna (2009: 6) calls “first 
order ceteris paribus moral principles”.  These are objective moral principles that 
prescribe what we ought to do in ideal circumstances.  Kant refers to these principles 
as “grounds of obligation” and explains that these are rules that an agent “prescribes 
to himself” (MM, 6: 224, 329).  The tenet not to lie falls into this category – it is a 
principle that establishes how we should, in general, conduct ourselves. 
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The third and final category of the hierarchy of moral principles contains “moral 
duties, which are first-order moral principles that are also agent-centred obligations” 
(Hanna, 2009: 6).  Moral duties are, simply put, what a particular agent ought to do in 
her specific set of circumstances.  Grounds of obligation tell us what we should do, 
“other things being equal” (Hanna, 2009: 6), while moral duties tell us what we 
should do in our specific situation, where other things are not equal.  Now that we 
have explained the key features of this interpretation of the categorical imperative, we 
may consider how it functions as an explanation for the permissibility or 
impermissibility of a particular action. 
 
Instead of subjecting the action in question to a test involving the three formulations 
of the categorical imperative, we intuitively recognise the rightness or wrongness of 
the action on Hanna‟s interpretation.  This is because the categorical imperative is 
known a priori – it “is an a priori synthetic practical proposition” (G, 420, 29).  
Because we know what our grounds of obligation are, we are able to determine the 
rightness or wrongness of an action for ourselves through reason alone.  Having 
established that the action is morally impermissible, then, we are able to appeal to the 
categorical imperative as an explanation as to why it is wrong – it fails to conform to 
the objective moral standard that is grounded by this principle. 
 
When we encounter the murderer at the door, on this view, we are immediately able 
to see that there are two conflicting grounds of obligation involved.  On the one hand, 
if we tell the truth to the murderer and allow him to kill our friend, we violate the 
“first-order substantive ceteris paribus moral principle requiring us to benefit others 
and prevent harm to them” (Hanna, 2009: 37); on the other hand, lying to the 
murderer goes against the tenet to be truthful, which is also ordinarily a ground of 
obligation.  In this case, then, it is clear that the two “grounds conflict with each 
other” (MM, 6: 224, 379), and this results in a moral dilemma. 
 
It is because of this conflict between two first-order principles that the moral dilemma 
occurs.  If the person at the door just asked us where the nearest Italian restaurant was, 
we might not even think twice about giving him an honest answer, because telling the 
truth would not violate any other ground of obligation.  In this case, however, the fact 
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that the murderer has evil intentions causes us to question whether, in this specific 
instance, there is a reason to override a moral principle that we already know to be 
true a priori, and whether we are permitted to lie to him to save our friend‟s life.   
 
We already see that it would be wrong to lie to the murderer under ordinary 
circumstances, since we know that lying is wrong – if it were not, there would be no 
moral dilemma to begin with and we would not have to think about what the best 
course of action is.  Typically, we are able to judge quite easily what we should do – 
we do not spend hours deliberating over our actions when performing everyday acts 
since the grounds of obligation are able to guide us under normal circumstances.  In 
the case of the murderer at the door, however, there are exceptional circumstances 
where the grounds of obligation conflict.  Here, the moral dilemma arises precisely 
because we know that both alternatives are prima facie wrong, and we must make a 
choice. 
 
How, then, ought we to deal with this moral dilemma?  Hanna (2009: 24, 29) provides 
a possible solution by making use of three key principles, called the No-Global-
Violation Constraint (NGV), the Excluded Middle Constraint (EMC) and the Lesser 
Evil Principle (LEP) respectively.  I will explain these principles in turn before 
considering how Hanna proposes resolving the moral dilemma. 
 
The NGV simply states that an act cannot be morally permissible if it violates any 
global moral principles; that is, if it goes against any of the absolute moral meta-
principles at the top level of Hanna‟s hierarchy.  From this principle, Hanna (2009: 
24) distinguishes between “global” and “local” moral transgressions – a global 
transgression violates a meta-principle such as the categorical imperative and is 
“strictly” forbidden, while a local one goes against our grounds of obligation and may 
be permissible “in some act-contexts”.  Applying this analysis to Kant‟s theory, any 
act that violates the categorical imperative is impermissible (since the imperative is a 
meta-principle), while grounds of obligation such as the injunction not to lie may be 
violated in some situations. 
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The EMC claims that “if an agent has a moral duty in an act-context, then there is 
always one and only one moral duty for an agent in that act context” (Hanna, 2009: 
24).  In all situations where we have a moral duty, there is, therefore, only one action 
that properly fulfils that duty, “no matter how difficult it is for the agent herself to 
discern it” (Hanna, 2009: 24).  This constraint is in line with Kant‟s discussion of 
duty, since he claims that “a collision of duties...  is inconceivable” (MM, 6: 224, 
379), which follows from the very concept of duty.  Because a duty “express[es] the 
objective practical necessity of certain actions” (MM, 6: 224, 378), it follows that we 
either act in accordance with our duty or violate it in a given situation.  There is an 
“excluded middle” since we cannot partially fulfil our duty – what we do is either 
right or wrong.  The word “duty” means what we ought to do in a certain situation, 
and any agent “only ever has one moral duty” in a particular context (Hanna, 2009: 
24).  Furthermore,  acting on any principle contrary to our duty “is morally 
impermissible in that context” (Hanna, 2009: 24). 
 
The immediate consequence of the ECM is that any conflicts of prima facie duties are 
not real conflicts, since duty simply describes the right act in the particular context.  
This means that, when we encounter a moral dilemma such as the one involving the 
murderer at the door, the dilemma is only an “apparent or prima facie” one (Hanna, 
2009: 25) since there is a right action that would not violate any meta-principles and 
be morally permissible on the LGV.  The dilemma arises simply because we cannot 
discern what this action would be, because the grounds of obligation that would 
normally guide our actions are in conflict.   
 
This situation is described by Hanna (2009: 29) as a “real local moral dilemma” since 
the conflict arises between grounds of obligation and not meta-principles.  We have to 
violate one of our grounds of obligation, but this would be only a local transgression 
in the terminology of the EGV.  This point, combined with the fact that there is only 
one duty that would be morally right, means we are able to act morally after all under 
the “desperately nonideal” conditions that characterise apparent moral dilemmas 
(Hanna, 2009: 2), and there is a third principle that we may appeal to in order to 
determine the right course of action. 
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This principle is the LEP, which Hanna (2009: 29) defines as follows:  “Given a real 
local moral dilemma between first-order substantive ceteris paribus moral principles, 
you ought to choose [the one] which in that context is the lesser of several evils, in the 
sense that acting on it most keeps rational faith with the Categorical Imperative.”  In 
other words, when two of our grounds of obligation conflict, we should choose the 
lesser evil, that is, the action that best matches the directives of the categorical 
imperative, or which “adequately expresses it” (Hanna, 2009: 30).  This seems to 
square with Kant‟s own solution to moral dilemmas, as he says that, when “two such 
grounds conflict with each other... the stronger ground of obligation prevails.”  Of 
course, we need to understand what is meant by “the stronger ground of obligation” 
and what it is to “keep rational faith” with the categorical imperative. 
 
Hanna‟s position is that keeping rational faith with the categorical imperative means 
seeking to uphold its ideals.  This means that we must consider our action as a local 
means towards a global end, and choose the action that aims to attain the ends 
prescribed by the categorical imperative, in any of its formulations.   
 
Thus, when we consider what to do in the case of the murderer at the door, we should 
not ask ourselves which action can be universalised, or best treats others as ends in 
themselves, or would be chosen by a universal law-maker in a kingdom of ends: 
instead, we have to ask ourselves whether, through our action, we aim to uphold or 
betray the ideals of the categorical imperative (Hanna, 2009: 38).  In situations of 
moral dilemmas, there is some evil in both alternatives – “each of your two options is 
an evil” (Hanna, 2009: 37).  Since we cannot avoid doing evil, then, we must choose 
the lesser evil according to the LEP. 
 
We can see what it means to uphold the ideals of the categorical imperative when 
considering the case of the murderer at the door.  If we lie to him, our lie is a means to 
achieve the “end of preventing murder” (Hanna, 2009: 38).  This squares with the 
categorical imperative‟s directive to prevent harm to others and, as it may be argued, 
our end in lying to the murderer is to prevent such harm, even if the means we use are 
evil.  Telling the truth, on the other hand, “would be to accede to or condone the 
murderer‟s intention to harm and treat the victim as a mere thing”, which is a far 
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greater evil than treating only the murderer as a mere thing without also harming 
someone else (Hanna, 2009: 38).   
 
Since the situation is framed in such a way that these are our only two possible 
choices, we must, according to the LEP, choose the lesser evil – this means that it is 
our duty to lie to the murderer under these conditions because, in Hanna‟s (2009: 38) 
terminology, “lying in this context is not globally wrong; on the contrary, it is locally 
obligatory and only ceteris paribus wrong.”  Furthermore, the lie is not told in an 
attempt to violate the categorical imperative – instead, it is told “for the sake of the 
categorical imperative” (Hanna, 2009: 39), in an attempt to preserve one of its rules.  
Thus, even though the lie is regrettable, and even though we must “take full 
responsibility for” it (Hanna, 2009: 39), it is our best option under the circumstances 
and constitutes our duty under these conditions.  Moreover it is consistent with the 
categorical imperative on the NGV, since it is only ceteris paribus wrong. 
 
Hanna‟s analysis seems to be a plausible way of interpreting the categorical 
imperative, and it seems to square with the way in which we ordinarily view morality.  
We have certain intuitions about what is right and what is wrong, and these intuitions 
arise because moral principles “can be apprehended completely a priori” (LE, 27: 
254, 49).  Apparent moral dilemmas occur when these grounds of obligation are in 
conflict with one another.  When we encounter these dilemmas, we usually try to 
choose the lesser evil, and we may sometimes regret the circumstances that force us to 
act in ways that we consider to be morally wrong.   
 
For example, if someone chooses to run away from a burning building in order to save 
her own life and that of her child instead of helping others trapped inside, she will, in 
all likelihood, experience regret and might even be subject to Hanna‟s (2009: 39) 
undesirable consequences of “moral criticism, blame[-] or punishment” from others.  
It is the fact that she recognises the grounds of obligation that bind her, and feels their 
force, that she acknowledges that there would ordinarily be something morally wrong 
in allowing innocent people to die when one could have saved them – however, under 
the circumstances, she may still be said to be doing her duty by rescuing her baby.  
We usually experience pangs of guilt or regret when we violate a moral law, even if it 
69 
 
is the best we could do, and Hanna‟s analysis provides an explanation for this – the 
act remains wrong to some extent, but it is only locally wrong. 
 
This interpretation of the categorical imperative leads to the conclusion that lying is, 
after all, always morally wrong – but only if the word “wrong” is interpreted to mean 
“locally wrong”, in Hanna‟s terms.  The categorical imperative does permit us to lie, 
but only when this is absolutely necessary in order to prevent a greater evil; that is, to 
prevent something that is globally wrong.  There is no obvious contradiction in saying 
that, although it is always wrong to lie, there are cases in which we must nevertheless 
do so since the alternative involves an even greater wrong.  According to Hanna, 
anyone who would condemn a person who lies to the murderer at the door (or in 
similar situations) would be a “moral idiot and a rule monger... a moral martinette or 
prig” (Hanna, 2009: 39) since he commits the “disastrous Flatlander Fallacy” (Hanna, 
2009: 36) of mistaking a local wrong for a global one. 
 
Hanna‟s interpretation, therefore, allows Kant to maintain that lying is always morally 
wrong without requiring us to tell the truth at all times.  Thus Kant‟s ethical theory is 
not inconsistent with the view that some lies are justifiable, because moral dilemmas 
permit us to tell lies in exceptional cases (even though it is deplorable that we must do 
so, and even though the ground of obligation that underlies our duty to tell the truth is 
still binding).  On this view, Kant simply draws the wrong conclusion in his essay 
about lying when he claims that we ought to tell the murderer at the door the truth.  
He merely gives priority to the prima facie duty to be truthful when he should prefer 
the principle of preventing harm to others, so that he is mistaken about which course 
of action best upholds the ideals of the categorical imperative.  As Hanna (2009, 40) 
notes, it is possible to make “errors in moral judgment”, and we may argue that this is 
exactly what Kant does.   
 
Of course, one might contend that it is Hanna who errs, and that allowing our friend to 
be harmed is only locally wrong, while the lie is the greater evil in this case.  This 
would mean that we ought to tell the murderer the truth, since, on the EMC, there is 
only one action that corresponds to our duty.  Regardless of which conclusion is the 
correct one to draw, however, this interpretation of the categorical imperative 
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provides us with a solution to the problem that Kant‟s theory is too rigorous to be 
taken seriously. 
 
If Hanna is correct to say that there is some action that corresponds to our duty in 
situations where two different grounds of obligation conflict with one another, it 
seems as though we need some way of determining what the right course of action is.  
There needs to be some sort of means of deciding when we are able to override 
grounds of obligation, particularly in difficult cases.  The scenario of the murderer at 
the door does not appear to be a difficult case, as it seems clear that we should lie to 
him to prevent the murder and override our obligation of answering honestly, but it is 
obvious that there may be some situations where it is not so obvious what our correct 
course of action is.  For instance, we might imagine a situation in which a security 
guard, trusted by her employer to watch over a vast amount of money in a vault, is 
tempted to steal some of it in order to pay for an expensive back operation that will 
make her physically disabled daughter more mobile. 
 
Here, it seems as though it is less obvious what the right course of action is.  The 
guard is faced with a conflict between two grounds of obligation, that is, between 
keeping her promise to her employer to guard the money and helping her sick 
daughter.  How can she tell which of her two grounds of obligation is more binding?  
Which possible action best upholds the spirit of the categorical imperative?  It seems 
as though there are good reasons to say that she should keep the money safe (since we 
are normally required to keep our promises to people who trust us), but one could also 
justify the theft, saying that the guard has an obligation to end her daughter‟s 
suffering. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a full theory of how we may decide 
moral dilemmas such as these while maintaining the spirit of Kant‟s categorical 
imperative, but it is possible to make some tentative suggestions regarding what such 
a theory would entail.  I propose that such a theory would need to refer primarily to 
autonomy and respect for persons in order to solve moral dilemmas, since these are 
the core values propounded in Kantian ethics.  Specifically, we must evaluate the 
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extent to which our actions disrespect the autonomy of others in order to determine 
what our duty is when we are faced with a moral dilemma. 
 
As I have argued previously, lying to the murderer is a lesser violation of Kant‟s 
commandment to promote autonomy than telling him the truth would be – lying 
thwarts only one of the murderer‟s goals, while honesty permits him to use his victim 
as a means to his own ends, thereby also permanently frustrating all her future 
projects.  Thus it may be argued that lying is the action that best promotes the 
categorical imperative – any action violates autonomy to some degree, and we are 
therefore bound to choose the lesser evil.  Since it is less disrespectful to lie to the 
murderer than to permit him to kill the victim, it is clear that we should lie.  We might 
also appeal to autonomy in deciding exactly what we are allowed to do to the 
murderer.  As I explained previously, it is plausible to argue that we may lie to him, 
block his path or push him down the stairs, but perhaps not cut off his arm or kill him 
– the last two responses represent a far greater degree of interference with his 
autonomy than the first two and are, therefore, impermissible.  A fully developed 
theory of when we are entitled to override some or other grounds of obligation will 
certainly need to take autonomy into account if it is to be Kantian in nature, and it 
may be argued that these considerations get the right answer in the case of the 
murderer at the door. 
 
In the case of the security guard, however, it is not at all obvious that one action better 
keeps faith with the categorical imperative than the other.  Stealing the money would 
be disrespectful to the employer and to the company as a whole, as well as possibly 
undermining the institution of promise-making (just as making a lying promise to get 
money would).  The theft also interferes with the employer‟s autonomy in using the 
money for whatever purposes he chooses.  Not taking it, on the other hand, means that 
many of the employee‟s daughter‟s goals continue to be frustrated, since the disability 
does not allow her to do several things that she would otherwise choose to do.  It 
seems as though it is not so easy to determine what should be done under these 
conditions, and the solution does not present itself as easily as in the example of the 
murderer at the door.   
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A further point worth noting is that the grounds of obligation remain binding even if 
we have a duty to override them on particular occasions.  For example, if a moral 
dilemma requires me to lie on one occasion in order to keep faith with the categorical 
imperative, I am still required to tell the truth in future interactions with people where 
there is no conflict between the grounds of obligation.  Moreover, I will have to 
acknowledge that I have done something wrong in violating the autonomy of the 
person to whom I told the lie.  The grounds of obligation requiring me to tell the truth 
still stand, but I have no choice but to violate them in the presence of a moral 
dilemma. 
 
Furthermore, a moral theory that keeps faith with the categorical imperative should 
not look at the consequences of a particular action, since, on Kant‟s analysis, the 
action is intrinsically right (or wrong) independently of its consequences.  As Nagel 
(1972: 124) points out, an absolutist position like Kant‟s does not “give[-] primacy to 
a concern with what will happen”, but rather “to a concern with what one is doing.”  
Thus we cannot simply say that stealing the money is likely to have better 
consequences than keeping the promise, since Kant‟s theory is not a consequentialist 
one; instead, we must examine the action itself and the degree to which it violates 
someone‟s autonomy, irrespective of the results of the action.  In a genuine moral 
dilemma, then, we must provide some reason for saying that one action is preferable 
to the other, and that one ground of obligation may be overridden more readily than 
another, without any appeal to its possible consequences.   
 
Considering a conflict between two grounds of obligation may be seen to be a 
consequentialist method of deciding what to do in a moral dilemma.  For instance, if I 
am faced with the choice of lying to the murderer or telling the truth to endanger my 
friend, it may be argued that I appeal to consequences when I choose to lie.  I foresee 
that the consequences of telling the truth are less desirable than those of lying, so I 
choose the latter option. 
 
Properly understood, however, the consideration of what should be done when there is 
a moral dilemma regards the action itself instead of its consequences.  Instead of 
asking ourselves, “What are the consequences of lying to the murderer?” we should 
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ask “To what extent do I disrespect the autonomy of the murderer if I lie to him?”  
This means that we do not consider the possible future effects of our actions in 
deciding what to do, but rather the degree to which they violate Kant‟s tenet that we 
should respect humanity.  Even if lying to the murderer has tragic results, we might 
still say that we make the right choice in doing so, because we do the best we can to 
respect our friend‟s humanity (despite violating the autonomy of the murderer).  The 
grounds of obligation are valid regardless of consequences, since they are part of an 
objective moral law, and we need some way of determining when they may be 
overridden without appealing to what will happen.   
 
Clearly, an explanation for why certain grounds of obligation may be overridden will 
have to appeal to autonomy, and there is a great deal of scope for further research 
regarding how we are to determine our duty in these cases.  For the purposes of this 
paper, however, it seems reasonable to say that there are at least some cases where 
lying could plausibly be said to uphold the principles of the categorical imperative 
better than other courses of action, and that we may sometimes override our 
obligation to tell the truth for the sake of autonomy.  
 
VII.  Conclusion 
In this paper I have examined the three formulations of Kant‟s categorical imperative 
and applied them to the case of lying to the murderer at the door (as well as to other 
cases of lies that we commonly regard to be morally permissible).  On the FUL, it 
seems as though we may justify some instances of lying, since the maxims on which 
they are based can plausibly be seen to pass the CC and CW tests.  We also see that it 
is essential to specify the maxim with exactly the right level of generality, to avoid the 
problems of false positives and false negatives, and that a maxim such as “I will 
always tell the truth” is much too general.  Thus we have to consider more specific 
maxims that include features that are relevant to the case at hand.  It seems reasonable 
to claim that the maxim of lying to save someone‟s life meets these conditions; and it 
appears to be universalisable, since its opposite maxim (telling the truth to expose 
someone else to unnecessary danger) is not.  Thus the FUL does not entail that we 
may never tell lies. 
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The FH abhors lying because it treats other people as mere means to ends that they 
cannot share, since they are deceived as to what these ends are, thereby disrespecting 
their autonomy.  However, the FH should be taken to apply only under ideal 
conditions.  When there are mitigating circumstances – that is, when someone intends 
to use us as a mere means to her ends, we may be permitted to lie in order to defend 
ourselves, even though this involves violating the autonomy of the person we lie to.  
The strategy of deceiving someone without lying outright, by telling a misleading 
truth to her instead of a blatant falsehood, does not allow us to escape disrespecting 
her autonomy, since it is our intention to deceive her that is objectionable and not the 
truth or falsehood of the statement we make.  Under non-ideal conditions, though, 
lying may be an acceptable means of self-defence and, on the FH, it is not always 
morally impermissible. 
 
In the kingdom of ends, it is plausible to suggest that there are certain lies – such as 
Kant‟s “harmless lies” or lies to save a life – that may be chosen by the lawmakers to 
apply to their realm.  Even if the universal co-legislators would outlaw all forms of 
lies, though, we may be permitted to lie to people who have, by their actions, shown 
themselves to be unable or unwilling to participate in the practice that is the kingdom 
of ends.  Since practice rules apply only to those who contribute to that practice, we 
are entitled to break the rules when dealing with non-participants, as the sporting 
analogies show.  However, there are limits as to how we may treat these non-
participants, and what rules we are allowed to break and to what extent we are 
allowed to break them depends on various features of the situation.  However, it is 
possible to think of some situations in which we may lie, even in the kingdom of ends, 
so the FKE also does not lead to the view that lying is always morally impermissible. 
 
Finally, it is possible to regard the categorical imperative as grounding an objective 
moral law rather than as a decision-making rule.  If we do so, we can explain how 
apparent moral dilemmas sometimes arise when some of our grounds of obligation are 
in conflict, as is the case with the murderer at the door.  There are principles that 
obligate us to be truthful in the absence of moral dilemmas, but, when a dilemma 
arises, we may sometimes be required to lie since this is a lesser evil and the action 
that best expresses the ideals of the categorical imperative. 
75 
 
 
The grounds of obligation requiring us to tell the truth stand, even in the presence of a 
moral dilemma, since lying always violates the spirit of the categorical imperative.  
This is because it disrespects the autonomy of those to whom the lie is told.  On this 
interpretation, there is always something morally wrong about lying, ceteris paribus.  
However, we are nevertheless required to lie in certain circumstances.  It is not so 
easy to determine when the grounds of obligation to tell the truth may be overridden, 
but it is clear that they must come into conflict with another, more pressing ground of 
obligation (such as to save a life) before we can reasonably say that we may violate 
their commandments.  In a moral dilemma, all possible courses of action go against 
some or other ground of obligation, and we have no choice but to override one of 
them, but they all, nevertheless, stand under ideal conditions. 
 
The preceding analysis shows that Kant‟s moral theory does not necessarily commit 
him to the view that we are always obliged to tell the truth.  His categorical 
imperative, in all of its forms, does not conclusively lead us to adopt his rigorous 
conclusion.  While it is likely that lying will turn out to be morally wrong in the 
majority of cases, it seems plausible to say that there will be at least some cases in 
which a lie will be justified or even obligatory.  Morality is not a discipline in which 
strict, universal laws can be applied rigidly in all and every circumstance, and there 
are likely to be situations in which we must depart from the grounds of obligation that 
would ordinarily bind us.  The categorical imperative is not infallible, and it might not 
even be a decision-making rule, but is nevertheless a useful tool in guiding us as to 
what we ought to do in a particular case. 
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